School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences

University of Birmingham

The Neoliberalisation and Responsibilisation of Flood Risk Management in Swindon, UK.

Name	Hope Steadman
Registration No	1414068

Submitted in accordance with requirements for BSc Single Honours in Geography

I confirm that the number of words is 9998, excluding abstract, acknowledgements, table of contents, tables, figures, reference list, appendices and quotations from primary data

I declare that this piece of work is all my own, and that any work by others has been acknowledged

Signed: ………..…………………………... Date: …………..…………………

Abstract

Marxist geographies define neoliberal capitalism as a political class project favouring ideologies of individualism and free competition. Such understandings are utilised in this dissertation to investigate how neoliberalisation and responsibilisation are changing the distribution of responsibilities for Flood Risk Management in Swindon, to add to studies of neoliberal nature. Using data from twenty-two institutional and public stakeholder interviews, and Critical Discourse Analysis of thirteen policy documents, it is shown that the mechanisms of self-responsibility, re-regulation and privatization, particularly in the policies of 'Partnership Funding' and 'Flood Re', are devolving responsibilities to local and private actors. Moreover, discourses of 'resilience', 'partnership' and 'freedom' are found to be utilised in attempts to inculcate neoliberal ideologies into 'common sense'. However, contradictions and complexities are found in the form of various neoliberal strategies and differing perceptions of participants. Drawing on works by authors including Harvey (2005), Castree (2011) and Marx (2013) himself, an exploration of debates regarding dialectics and consciousness is useful for addressing previously politically weak studies of FRM, concluding that the proliferation of neoliberal capitalism embeds class inequalities. Undesirable impacts of neoliberal capitalism are found, particularly uneven geographies of development and the concentration of wealth and power for economic elites.

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who participated in the interviews for this dissertation, and took the time to provide me with valuable and interesting insights. Your support has made this dissertation possible.

I would also like to thank my family, and my partner George, for supporting me throughout this dissertation with (relatively) little complaint.

I would finally like to thank my supervisor and tutor, Dr Steven Emery, for providing me with much valued guidance throughout, and giving me the encouragement to pursue my interests.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Contextual Background and Justification

1.2 Research Aims

1. Introduction

1.1 Contextual Background and Justification

This dissertation understands the logics, outcomes, processes and expressions of neoliberal capitalism in Flood Risk Management (FRM) in Swindon. The increasing dominance of neoliberalism as a project to restructure and rescale economic, political and social relations has been noted by numerous scholars (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Jessop, 2002). Central to this dissertation is the work of Harvey (2005), characterizing neoliberalism as a political class project to implement individual responsibilities, free markets and private property rights. Marxist interpretations, utilised in this dissertation, are crucial in critically analysing and addressing how neoliberalism establishes conditions for capital accumulation and the associated concentration of power and wealth for economic elites (*ibid.*).

The concept of neoliberalisation understands the contradictory and dialectical elements of neoliberal processes, and how these create varied consequences (Heynen and Robbins, 2006). Understanding the particularities of neoliberal ideologies helps to trace their entrenchment as 'common sense' in spatially and temporally specific cases, and how the 'false promises' of neoliberalism are realized in often environmentally and socially undesirable outcomes (Heynen et al., 2007). Dialectical understandings justify the Marxist geographies employed in this dissertation, considering the "dialectic of connectivity and difference, similarity and particularity" of life, in the form of uneven development (Castree, 2007, p.282).

The proliferation of discussions surrounding the neoliberalisation of nature, including those found in this dissertation, are vital to understand the political nature of environmental change (Heynen et al., 2007). Although relatively sparse, works tracing how particular neoliberal mechanisms create environmental change are influential for this dissertation, including discussions of privatization (McCarthy, 2004) and de-regulation (Prudham, 2007). Commonly analysed are self-responsibility and individualism, conceptualised by the process of 'responsibilisation' which describes how new actors are afforded responsibilities previously possessed by the state, often associated with individual responsibility to protect against

environmental risk (Hutter et al., 2014). Important also is an understanding of how discourse legitimizes neoliberalisation, demonstrated by studies of 'freedom' (Castree, 2010b), 'partnerships' (Geddes, 2006) and 'resilience' (Welsh, 2014), as will also be employed in this dissertation.

'Resilience' has recently been utilised in analysis of FRM to understand how this normalizes self-responsibility (Rinne and Nygren, 2016). Most literature tracing the restructuring of FRM in England understands changes in policy and responsibilities, however a dearth of research exists explicitly questioning neoliberal mechanisms, motivations and outcomes in FRM (Thaler and Priest, 2014). This is cause for concern in geography, owing to Primrose's (2013) assertion that "too little attention has been given to challenging the underlying social relations of neoliberalism to promote a fundamental shift in institutional logics" (p.7). A critical focus is therefore a necessity to 'unveil' destructive neoliberalisations, in the hopes of increased scrutiny on their deleterious impacts. As such, employing a Marxist lens challenges the proliferation of exploitative processes of capitalist accumulation, serving to reinforce and embed class difference. It is therefore this gap in FRM research that this dissertation will fill.

It is also necessary to ground theorizations of neoliberal nature in specific contexts and evidence. Considering the neoliberal project as "constitutively differentiated" allows for an understanding of 'actually existing neoliberalisms', "rather than what ideal-typical arguments say it *will* or *should be*" (Castree, 2007, p.282; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). As such, the application of neoliberalisation to FRM demonstrates a particular originality and specificity of analysis. It is hoped that such an approach will add to existing research surrounding neoliberal environments, "collectively affording new contributors and readers the possibility of thinking comparatively across sectors and geographical contexts" (Heynen et al., 2007, p.288). This is particularly important in geography, owing to the critical perspectives that can be afforded to the uneven development created by neoliberalisation.

<u>1.2 Research Aims</u>

Owing to these justifications, there is a particular need to understand both how and why FRM responsibilities are changed by neoliberal strategies. The following research aims have been formalized:

- to investigate how responsibilities of FRM in England are changing through the implementation of neoliberal policy discourses and mechanisms
- to investigate how FRM responsibilities are perceived and understood by stakeholders in Swindon
- to investigate and reflect upon the consequences and outcomes of the neoliberalisation and responsibilisation of FRM

By investigating processes and outcomes of neoliberalisation, as well as perceptions of these, it is possible to understand divergences between neoliberal logics and promises, and the actualities on the ground. This allows for an experiential account of responsibilisation, as well as a focused investigation of the attempted inculcation of neoliberalism into 'common sense'. The mechanisms of self-responsibility, re-regulation and privatization are respectively understood through neoliberal discourse of resilience, partnerships and freedom. This research is based in Swindon, allowing for suitable breadth and scope, while also situating neoliberal processes in a local context. Therefore, the overall research question to address is as follows:

How has the process of Neoliberalisation affected the distribution of responsibilities for Flood Risk Management (FRM) in Swindon and what are the impacts of this?

This dissertation will discuss the relevant literatures, concerning neoliberal capitalism, neoliberal mechanisms and responsibilisation, before discussing the methods of data collection and analysis employed, namely semi-structured interviews and the coding of these, as well as a Critical Discourse Analysis. A discussion of results will precede a final conclusion demonstrating the importance of this study's main findings.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Neoliberalisation and Neoliberal Capitalism

2.3 Consciousness and Common Sense

2.4 Mechanisms

    2.4.1 Self-Responsibility and Resilience

    2.4.2 Re-Regulation and Partnerships

    2.4.3 Privatization and Freedom

2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore the main concepts and literature this dissertation is based on. It will discuss neoliberalisation and how it has been influenced by Marxist thought, before considering Marxist understandings of consciousness and ideology. Specific mechanisms and discourses of neoliberalisation and responsibilisation will finally be explored. Justification for this is apparent, owing to the lack of work regarding the neoliberalisation of FRM.

2.2 Neoliberalisation and Neoliberal Capitalism

Critiques of neoliberalism have been prevalent since its perceived origination in the 1970-80s. As suggested in the preceding chapter, in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* Harvey (2005) describes neoliberalism as a political and economic system favouring a free market ontology and ideology, with private enterprise and commodification as key to competition and ultimate wealth creation. An understanding of neoliberal mechanisms and discourse has been central for neo-Marxists, including Harvey (2003) and Castree (2008;2010a;2010b). Marxist geographies understand the ways in which economic spaces are "permeated by structural relations of social power deeply consequential for political life" (Rupert, 2003, p.182). As such, neoliberal capitalism recognises how "neoliberalism is capitalism, although a particular historical variant of capitalism" (Castree, 2007, p.287). It is taken as a project of class power to enable capital accumulation and institutionalise wealth and power for the ruling capitalist class.

Marx's historical materialism understands social relations to be constituted by the "progressive augmentation of the forces of production" (Giddens, 1995, p.1). Marx (1999) suggests how "capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character" (p.568). The capitalist mode of production is constituted by historical processes of production, defined by social struggle and exploitation of land and labour. Giddens (1995) criticises this however,

suggesting it is power that articulates social systems, rather than simply class or history. Furthermore, Graham (1988) considers these totalizing and structuralist understandings of economic relations, failing to understand class as "one of many competing discourses" (p.62).

In response is Harvey's (1996) dialectical materialism, re-invigorating the importance of Marxist geographies, by considering capital a multifaceted process, spatially and temporally dependent. Dialectics understands the variety of results that common processes of neoliberal capitalism create. Neoliberalisation is dynamic and complex, constituted by "a set of generative and transformative principles, embedded in continuous processes, which, by virtue of internalized heterogeneity and contradiction, reveals the possibility to create all kinds of new but always transient state of things" (*ibid.*, p.67).

It is thus important to understand dialectical theories of *neoliberalisation*. Heynen and Robbins (2006) define neoliberalisation as a contextual and path-dependent process, while neoliberalism exists as merely a 'thing'. Jessop (2002) also considers neoliberalisation a process which rescales and restructures social relations. It is "a real existing process rather than a geographical thing", shaping and shaped by everyday practices and institutions (Castree, 2006, p.1). Brenner and Theodore (2002) further this to suggest 'actually existing neoliberalisms' in which every-day processes of socio-spatial transformation are inherently contradictory and historically specific, producing persistent inequalities.

2.3 Consciousness and Common Sense

Harvey (1996) furthers these dialectic understandings to theorise the dialectics of discourse. He suggests ideologies of neoliberal capitalism are legitimized by discourse, defined and generated by those with access to power and information, selectively promoting or obscuring meaning. Discourse, however, not only produces social relations, but is reproduced through internalisations of its ideologies. Thus, "human beings can imprison themselves in systems and things of their own construction" (*ibid.*, p.83). Discourse becomes embedded in knowledge and consciousness, constraining and regulating behaviours.

In *The German Ideology,* Marx and Engels (1968) explore how capitalist ideologies become embedded through the construction of the *permanence* of discourse by the ruling class, constructing a homogenous and universal societal consciousness. Neoliberal discourse ensures "immediate self-consciousness can be substituted by social ideology", perpetuating the apparent dissolution of inequalities, separating consciousness from reality (Smith, 2010, p.65). Harvey (2005) suggests that capitalist ontologies are constructed as 'common sense', assuming no asymmetries of power or information, and simultaneously constructing consent for its continuation.

This theorization of 'false consciousness' is often critiqued as overly generalising, overlooking the material existence of the ideological, and its operation in everyday practice (Rehmann, 2015). Gramsci's (1999) contributions are particularly important in addressing Marx's 'naivety', unable to grasp the dynamic nature of consciousness (Rehmann, 2015). Gramsci (1999) suggests a heterogeneous consciousness, "a chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions" (p.773). There exists the possibility of creating counter-hegemony through the 'war of position', understood as cultural and intellectual struggle against economic elites, developing Marxist interpretations to grasp the possibilities of human agency.

In particular, Gramsci (1999) explores the material existence of ideology, redefining the previous abstraction of ideology through an understanding of how hegemony is exercised through both 'consent' and 'coercion', creating a *heterogenous* 'common sense'. Of note is the role of the state itself as an economic elite, its power subject to

reorientation by the ruling class. Thus, the neoliberal state comes to express the social balance of power, through institutional arrangements and legislation which favours individualism and free markets, explored in the Discussion (Ioris, 2015). While Giddens (1995) criticizes this, suggesting the state's existence as more than "an arena of the operation of class forces" (p.217), a continued understanding of its ability to dominate and coerce society is nevertheless important. According to Gramsci (1999), the state, operating for the will of capitalism, ""legally" enforces discipline" using coercive power to ensure domination of ruling class interests. (p.145). 'Consent' to this domination is developed within civil society, through the exercise of functions of social hegemony by intellectuals, operating through social institutions (*ibid.*).

Despite these influential contributions, neoliberal capitalism is criticised as over-deterministic and 'capitalocentric', simplified and one-way (Castree, 2006). Responding to this is post-Marxism, revealing divisions of society other than class, and the importance of human agency in challenging oppressive power relations (Goldstein and Natoli, 2004). The implementation of the Foucauldian concept of 'governmentality' has been an important step in embracing post-structuralism, suggested by McCarthy and Prudham (2004) to be essential for emphasizing state power on multiple scales. This in turn has been criticised by Barnett (2005) for failing to anchor the concept in everyday life, simplifying power relations by focusing only on larger spatial scales. Nevertheless, Scatamburlo-D'Annibale and McLaren (2004) suggest the continued importance of class analysis to avoid post-Marxist reductions of class to another form of 'difference', blind to material forces, thus allowing class inequalities to perpetuate. It is therefore recognised here that while class remains one of many discourses, it must be operationalized to understand, and cure, social ills.

2.4 Mechanisms

This section will explore the mechanisms in which 'actually existing neoliberalisms' materialise, understanding *how* wealth and power are concentrated for the ruling class.

However, it is first important to note the work concerning the neoliberalisation of nature specifically, framing the motivations for applying such theories to FRM. There have been substantial contributions regarding interpretations of nature within Marx's work (Foster, 2000), yet there remains relatively little regarding Marxist interpretations of *neoliberal* nature. Contributions to *Neoliberal Environments*, influenced by streams of political ecology, are the notable exception to this, demonstrating how various mechanisms have neoliberalised nature in specific contexts (Heynen et al., 2007). It is therefore necessary to use this approach to theorise the neoliberalisation of FRM, a field in which there exists a relative dearth of research.

2.4.1 Self-Responsibility and Resilience

The first mechanism to be considered is self-responsibility, justified by discourse of 'resilience'. McCarthy and Prudham (2004) define re-regulation as the 'rollback' of the state, in which responsibilities are devolved to local levels, and regulation restricting markets is removed. This demonstrates what Butler and Pidgeon (2011) term 'government at a distance', whereby decentralization allows free competition of markets, establishing conditions for further capital accumulation. De-centralization creates a process of 'responsibilisation', assigning self-responsibility for services formerly provided by state welfare to private individuals, who are 'responsibilised' as neoliberal instruments (Liverman, 2008).

Harvey (2005) suggests this is characterized by individualistic discourse, ascribing personal blame for individual actions. Personal well-being and autonomy is only guaranteed through individual responsibilities and accountabilities, defined by successes in personal entrepreneurialism, and the freedoms of the market and knowledge-based economy (*ibid*.). Rinne and Nygren (2016) suggest self-responsibility exacerbates class inequalities in society, owing to the differential

capacities of individuals to address vulnerabilities, leading to "risk zones", due to the embedded "culture of damage" that neoliberalisation creates (p.18). Self-responsibility thus heightens exposure to impoverishment, creating 'uneven geographies of development' (Smith, 2010). Therefore, self-responsibility veils the fault of exploitative capitalist accumulation for failures.

'Resilience' is conventionally described as the ability to adapt to and recover from an abnormal event (Welsh, 2014). Advantages are thus evident, in the increased efficiency, adaptability and legitimacy of flood risk governance (Alexander et al., 2016). Despite this, many contend that discourses of resilience responsibilise citizens to live with uncertainty and manage their own risk (Hutter et al., 2014). As such, Joseph (2013) sees resilience as another form of self-responsibility. In other words, "'resilient' peoples do not look to states to secure their wellbeing because they have been disciplined into believing in the necessity to secure it for themselves" (Reid, 2012, p.69). Resilience promises the management of change, with the simultaneous avoidance of any fundamental shift, maintaining the status quo, thus normalizing class relations.

Responsibilisation through resilience accompanies the 'rollback' of environmental regulation, in which "the social safety net is reduced to a bare minimum" (Harvey, 2005, p.76). Considering water contamination in Walkerton, Prudham (2007) suggests that "organized irresponsibility is built into regulatory systems", naturalising the production of new environmental risk by capitalist processes, in which a *laissez-faire* approach is taken to governance (p.165). Butler and Pidgeon (2011) suggest this naturalization characterizes the shift from flood defence to flood risk management, in which state welfare is replaced by self-responsibility through resilience. Resilience conceals the social causes for differing vulnerabilities, while limiting autonomy, re-embedding class relations of capitalism. This will be explored in the Discussion.

Within FRM is a perceived change from 'resistance' to 'resilience', with growing marketization of resilience in the form of Property Level Protection (PLP) (O'Hare et al., 2016). Castree (2011) describes marketization as the creation of new markets for the trade of environmental assets, regulated to appropriate and standardize these assets. PLP is increasingly promoted in FRM, including the implementation of tiling

or flood resistant doors, encouraging self-protection not funded by the general taxpayer. Resilience and PLP will be investigated in the Discussion to understand if 'uneven geographies of development' materialise (Smith, 2010).

2.4.2 Re-Regulation and Partnerships

In response to de-regulation comes a contradictory process of re-regulation, or 'roll out' neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Harvey (2005) suggests that while the state take a 'backseat', they're often required to regulate markets to behave competitively. State intervention is thus an unwelcome but necessary factor to ensure 'free choice' of markets, regulating the uneven development produced by the class relations of capital accumulation (Jessop, 2002). These processes pertain to Brenner and Theodore's (2002) 'creative destruction', in which there exists the destruction of institutional arrangements, with the resultant "creation of new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital" (p.362).

Re-regulation is demonstrated by 'Partnership Funding', a policy whereby eligible local FRM projects are provided a quantity of central Flood Defence Grant-in-Aid (FDGiA) funding, however any extra project costs above this quantity must be covered by local contributions, shown by Figure 2.1 (Penning-Rowsell and Priest, 2015).


Figure 2.1: Distribution of FDGiA funding (East Anglia Coastal Group, 2014, p.2)

Although relative quiet exists, commendations include the increased sharing of financial burden, although this fails to critically question such moves (*ibid.*). As such, an understanding of the negative impacts of this policy will be investigated in the Discussion.

Discourse of 'partnership' is important in neoliberal critiques, in which the increased role of community participation is considered "a flanking, compensatory mechanism for the inadequacies of the market mechanism" (Jessop, 2002, p.455). While some suggest the possibilities for partnerships in 'progressive spaces' of neoliberalism, including inclusivity and empowerment (Lewis, 2009), Geddes (2006) highlights how outcomes of partnerships are significantly constrained by neoliberal agendas, including the domination of priorities geared towards entrepreneurialism and capital accumulation. Davies (2007) also suggests that partnerships highlight responsibilisation owing to the displacement of responsibility by the state, with simultaneous centralization of state power over partnership practices through managerialism and scrutiny. Peck and Tickell (2002) term this 'regulatory dumping', selectively appropriating the 'community' to mobilize neoliberal practices. The role of partnerships in FRM has received little attention, and thus will be discussed in relation to Partnership Funding in the Discussion.

2.4.3 Privatization and Freedom

This final section will discuss the mechanism of privatization and its normalization through discourses of 'freedom'.

Marx's (2013) primitive accumulation is described as the first stage of accumulation, a historical process of separation of producer from means of production. Individual self-earned feudal property was transformed into capitalist private property, swallowing both land and labour into the capitalist mode of production, "which rests on the nominally free labour of others i.e., on wage-labour" (Marx, 2013, p.534). Harvey's (2003) more applicable 'accumulation by dispossession' for *neoliberal* capitalism describes how public assets are dispossessed and released into the market, subsequently accumulated by capitalists for profitable use. In other words, "Valuable assets are thrown out of circulation and devalued. They lie fallow and

dormant until surplus capital seizes upon them to breathe new life into capital accumulation" (*ibid.*, p.151).

Polanyi (2001) understands how such processes are legitimized by discourses of 'liberty' and 'freedom', apparently provided by competitive markets. Neoliberal autonomy denotes individual 'freedom of choice' to determine actions and behaviour. According to Marx (2013), this is an illusionary notion of freedom, in which the individual is subject to market rules and authoritarian regulation. Freedom "degenerates into a mere advocacy of free enterprise – which is today reduced to a fiction by the hard reality of giant trusts and princely monopolies" (Polanyi, 2001, p.265). Individual autonomy is severely limited and even suppressed by neoliberal ontologies, with discourses of freedom veiling exploitative capital accumulation.

Privatization is prevalent in the neoliberalisation of nature, including McCarthy's (2004) analysis of trade agreements. Specific to FRM, Geaves and Penning-Rowell (2016) understand benefits of privatization in attracting 'buy-in' for flood protection due to increased private responsibilities, reducing taxpayer burden. Concepts of 'justice' are thus employed by authors such as Johnson et al. (2007) to understand libertarian approaches to guarantee fairness, premised on free markets, and utilitarian concepts to ensure aggregate societal happiness, in which a 'beneficiary-pays' approach reduces general burden. However, Heynen and Perkins (2007) warn that "public services and publicly owned infrastructures are in essence "destroyed" as they are turned over to the private sector for management" (p.193). Furthermore, Swyngedouw (2007) suggests changing power relations with privatization's related responsibilisation, perpetuating greater power for private companies, which may mean less for the individual.

Flood insurance in England has been provided by public-private partnerships since the Statement of Principles, with state regulation ensuring profit maximization for private insurers (Penning-Rowsell, 2015). Few works have focused on 'Flood Re', a re-insurance scheme which creates a 'pool' from which claims can be made by insurers to cover the costs of expensive premiums, funded by a tax on all home insurers (*ibid.*). Thus, a lower premium is set and the insurer is reimbursed from Flood Re, demonstrated by Figure 2.2:

Figure 2.2: How Flood Re works (DEFRA, 2014a, p.2)

This allows for a 'competitive' market to transition to a risk-reflective system of pricing in twenty-five years. Capitalistic motivations for Flood Re will be investigated in the Discussion to cover the dearth of research in the field.

The next section will demonstrate the methodological approach taken to investigate the applicability of these theories to FRM.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

3.1 Approaches

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Interviews

3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1 Coding

3.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

3.4 Limitations

3. Methodology

This chapter will discuss the design of the study, demonstrating methods of data collection and analysis used, and the justifications for these.

<u>3.1 Approaches</u>

A Marxist approach ensures a critical focus on the historical social processes that create inequalities and concentrate wealth (Harvey, 2005). This dissertation understands how capitalism continuously reproduces social life to transform the individual into an appendage of capital (*ibid.*). Use of Harvey's (1996) dialectics addresses critiques of the over-determinism of Marxism, analysing multi-faceted socio-spatial transformations, and the inherently contradictory nature of capitalism.

Investigating everyday life within the local context is imperative in neoliberal analyses (Barnett, 2005). An evidence-based approach as suggested by Castree (2006) is therefore used, focusing on FRM in the local context of Swindon, avoiding abstraction and generalization. Swindon was chosen for its practical location due to living arrangements, as well as its relevance to FRM. Historical fluvial and surface water flooding in Swindon, particularly in 2007, has increased attention surrounding FRM responsibilities in the area, leading to a range of initiatives, including the creation of Flood Action Groups in 2014. This allowed for ease of access in recruiting participants, justifying Swindon as the study location. The responsibilities for FRM in Swindon are consistent with those defined nationally, shown in Figure 3.1, minus an IDB.

Flood risk management responsibility	Lead authority
Main rivers[7] and coastal flooding	Environment Agency
Surface water – caused by rainwater flowing over or accumulating on land before it can enter a river or drainage system **Groundwater** – water building up below the ground and rising up to emerge on the surface	Your Lead Local Flood Authority (Upper tier, i.e. county council or unitary authority)
Ordinary watercourses[8]	Your Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA) unless in an Internal Drainage Board (IDBs) district
Sewers – water that entered the sewer system higher up, escaping from the system at a lower level. Burst water main or water escaping from a reservoir	Your water and sewerage company (e.g. Thames Water)
Flooding relating to land drainage in low-lying areas where land drainage ditches are common	Usually Internal Drainage Boards
Flooding related to water draining off motorways or trunk roads	Highways Agency

Figure 3.1: Responsibilities of Flood Risk Management (DEFRA, 2012, p.14)

3.2 Data Collection

Both Critical Discourse Analysis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews were employed, the latter discussed in the next section. An iterative methodological process (Figure 3.2) was found to be successful, due to the constant comparisons and revisions facilitated.

Figure 3.2: Iterative Methodologies

3.2.1 Interviews

While a range of interview methods, such as video interviews, were employed for practical reasons (Appendix A), face-to-face semi-structured interviews formed the core of primary data collection. Semi-structured interviews allowed for comparable answers to be garnered from a pre-determined interview schedule (Appendix B), while providing flexibility to explore unanticipated issues (Valentine, 2008). As such, "bringing the particularity of situated knowledges and practices to life precludes the production of overgeneralizing narratives about neoliberal projects", using a previously under-developed methodology in research of neoliberal environments (Sundberg, 2007, p.270). Perceptions of stakeholder responsibilities and impacts of neoliberalisation addressed the second and third research questions, using a sensitive and people-oriented methodology (Valentine, 2008):

2.How are FRM responsibilities perceived by different stakeholders in Swindon?

3.What are the outcomes of neoliberalisation and responsibilisation for different stakeholders?

Qualitative interviews understand depth of meaning behind social processes, through an exploration of embodied, emotional, experiential and politically embedded social practices, relevant for a Marxist approach (DeLyser and Sui, 2014). Twenty-two interviews with twenty-nine participants were conducted:

Number of Interviews	22
Recorded (transcribed) total hours of interviews	20 hours 43 mins 30 secs
Recorded and unrecorded total hours of interviews	25 hours 18 mins 30 secs
Mean Average Interview Length	1 hour 9 mins 1 sec

Table 3.1: Interview Information

These were conducted with the organized and general public, as well as with institutions:

Institution/Type	Number of Interviews
Local Authority	1
Planning Authority	1
Neighbouring Authority	1
Water Company	1
Environment Agency	1
Transport Authority	3
Emergency Services	2
Consultant (*including Mary Dhonau – lack of anonymity requested*)	2
Contractor	1
Flood Charity	1
Community Groups	2
Flood Action Groups	2
Members of the public	1 (*+1 e-mail communications*)
Private Developer	1
Housing Association	1
Landowner	1

Table 3.2: Participant Information

In general, participants were recruited due to their experience of, or responsibilities for FRM within Swindon (for more specifics see Appendix C), with institutional perspectives providing particularly knowledgeable understandings. Thus, purposeful sampling was utilised via written or telephone communications. 'Snowball' sampling was then used, represented by Figure 3.3, with elites acting as 'gateways' to other relevant individuals, due to their influential status in "social networks, social capital

and strategic position within social structures" (Harvey, 2011, p.433). Interviews were recorded (dependent on interviewee consent) and a research diary was kept, regarding key points and personal reflections (Appendix D). Interviews were conducted until diminishing returns were perceived and thus "theoretical saturation" was reached (Cook and Crang, 1995, p.12).

Figure 3.3: Sampling

Inner circle: Purposeful sampling

Outer circle: Snowball sampling

27

3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1 Coding

Interview notes were taken and recordings transcribed verbatim to allow for the use of direct quotes, using a combination of *a priori* coding and grounded theory to define codes. Grounded theory avoids determinism by allowing unexpected ideas to surface, which are then further researched through 'constant comparison' to address new concepts in data collection (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). *A priori* coding allowed for data to be ascribed to pre-defined theories and concepts to ground categories in the research questions and understand social meaning, important for this dissertation (Dey, 2005). Table 3.3 shows the reasons for each approach:

Grounded Theory	A Priori Coding
- Flexible and creative - Open to new ideas - Allows for a holistic understanding - Well-defined procedures of analysis	- Allows for understanding of social meaning - Gives large quantities of data - Codes already from relevant existing theory

Table 3.3: Grounded Theory and A Priori Coding (adapted from Cho and Lee, 2014, p.15)

Codes were developed on the basis of Ryan and Bernard's (2003) 'difficult' approach, considering 1-9 and 11:

Figure 3.4: Coding Techniques (Ryan and Bernard, 2003, p.102)

Descriptive coding gave an initial overview of data, before using 'cutting and sorting' to place important phrases into more sophisticated thematic categories (Appendix E) (Dey, 2005). Hierarchies were then developed to further refine analysis. Due to the scope of this work and the large quantity of data collected, a selection of codes was taken forward, found in Appendix F. Finally, links were developed between mechanisms, perceptions of responsibilities and consequences of change, found in Appendix G, explicitly addressing the research aims. This recognises that codes are inevitably indiscrete and complex (*ibid.*).

3.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

As described in the Literature Review, ideology is legitimized and hegemonized through discourse by those with power in society, "produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices" (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, p.175). Discourse analysis has been employed previously to understand how language 'makes' politics and shifts power balances, for example in understanding neoliberalism (Fairclough, 2013), environmental governance (Oels, 2013) and FRM (Rinne and Nygren, 2016). Combining these approaches allows for a new and critical perspective.

Fairclough's (1989) *Critical* Discourse Analysis (CDA) was chosen due to its Marxist influence, addressing social wrongs and understanding how social structures determine and are a product of social practice. CDA is therefore important for this study due to its ability to understand the relational and dialectical properties of discourse, and how "every practice has a semiotic element" (Fairclough, 2001,

p.122). Thirteen documents were analysed, the reasons for their selection highlighted in Table 3.4:

Document(s) Analysed	Motivation for Analysis
Making Space for Water (DEFRA, 2004)	Important and well-known consultation document looking at the state of FRM at the time. Aided in analysing how discourse had changed over time, from this document to later publications.
Flood and Water Management Act 2010 (FWMA, 2010)	Significantly restructured FRM in the UK, creating Risk Management Authorities (Environment Agency, Lead Local Flood Authorities and water companies).
Understanding the risks, empowering communities, building resilience: the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England (Environment Agency, 2011)	Of interest for understanding how discourses of 'community', 'resilience' and 'partnership' are used.
Corporate Plan 2014 to 2016 (Environment Agency, 2014)	This gave more background knowledge regarding the state of resource and funding, as well as the more commercialised approach of the Environment Agency as opposed to previous documents.
Swindon Local Flood Risk Management Strategy (Swindon Borough Council, 2014)	Strategy created in response to FWMA (2010) – important analysis and understanding of local contexts.
Obtaining flood insurance in high risk areas (DEFRA, 2012)	Analysed to understand how the government gives advice to and persuades members of the public into buying flood insurance.
Thames Catchment Management Plan (Environment Agency, 2009)	More background knowledge of the regional context.
The First Flood Re Transition Plan (Flood Re, 2016)	Important for understanding the discourse behind privatization strategies.
Principles for Implementing Flood and Coastal Resilience Funding Partnerships (Environment Agency, 2012a)	Important for understanding the discourse behind re-regulation strategies.
Partnership Pays: a short guide for developers and private investors; Partnership Pays: a short guide for local authorities and internal drainage boards; Partnership Pays: a short guide for local communities (Environment Agency, 2012b;2012c;2012d)	Analysed to understand how re-regulation is 'sold' to various audiences, and differences in language and content because of this.
Post-Installation Effectiveness of Property Level Flood Protection (DEFRA, 2014b)	Aided in understanding the motivations for the growing Property Level Protection market.

Table 3.4: CDA Documents

This aided in answering the first research question:

1. *How are FRM responsibilities changing through neoliberal mechanisms and policy discourse?*

CDA was carried out using a checklist (Appendix H) to understand intertextuality, interdiscursive and linguistic techniques, as well as experiential, expressive and relational values (Fairclough, 1989;1992;2001). Appendix I shows an example of how documents were analysed.

3.4 Limitations

The main difficulty was gaining access to participants for elite interviews. Smith (2006) suggests elites have busy timetables, and are often unwilling to be interviewed to protect professional reputation. Furthermore, interviews often possessed a 'performative nature', with an 'artificial character' performed by interviewees, calling into question the extent of the 'free' opinion given (Davies et al., 2002; Mohammad and Sidaway, 2013). This was exemplified by the necessity of holding interviews in elite offices to fit with schedules, reflecting a 'public relations version' of the truth (Mikecz, 2012). Problems with access were overcome through tenacity, organisation and flexibility, and the various sampling techniques employed. Due to the flexibility required, interviews with elites were arranged up to 3-4 months in advance, mostly on different days to allow for last minute changes.

The issue of power relations, however, requires consideration. The usually powerful position of the interviewer in geographical research is reversed in elite interviews, with control taken by the interviewee (*ibid.*). Despite this, Smith (2006) suggests the need to consider how elites can still feel exposed or vulnerable. Thus, "power relations are neither static nor one-way" (Rabia, 2015, p.794). Building trust and rapport not only aided in overcoming such vulnerabilities, guiding participants 'in' and 'out' of interviews, but also persuaded respondents to participate more freely.

Furthermore, ethical considerations ensured morality and responsibility in research (Valentine, 2005). An ethics form (Appendix J) ensured veracity, confidentiality, and an agreed 'semi-anonymity', in which identities were withheld, instead only quoting

the company's function. Opinions were also taken as personal, rather than attributable to the organisation, allowing for more willingness and comfort (Wiles, 2013).

Reflexivity calls for self-consciousness of research methods, to avoid the "false neutrality and universality" of academic knowledge (Rose, 1997, p.306). My own positionality, regarding political views of FRM and governance in Swindon, is likely to have imposed my beliefs and expectations on to data. In particular, values taken from the CDA "depend on the interpreter's typification of the situational context" (Fairclough, 1989, p.151). Furthermore, through coding of interviews, data is inevitably taken out of context and distorted by positionalities and assumptions, leading to a "crisis of representation" (Winchester, 1996, p.125).

Post-modern critiques of Marxist geographers often criticise the *lack* of class consciousness of the researcher (Scatamburlo-D'Annibale and McLaren, 2004). Hence it is important to understand that my own middle class upbringing (defined by qualifications, lifestyle, economic factors and culture) may impact analysis, and perhaps give this research a hypocritical tone. The awareness of this however, ensures the "conscious analysis of situatedness", recognizing the "messiness" of research and allowing for a degree of transparency (Rose, 1997, p.312;314).

This dissertation will now discuss the results of the investigation.

Chapter 4 – Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Self-Responsibility, Resilience and 'Common Sense'

    4.2.1 Uneven Geographies of Development

    4.2.2 Individualism

    4.2.3 'Common Sense' Capitalist Accumulation

4.3 Re-Regulation: Partnership Funding

    4.3.1 'Partnerships' as Entrepreneurship

    4.3.2 'Partnerships' as Capitalistic

4.4 Privatization

    4.4.1 Freedom

    4.4.2 Accumulation by Dispossession

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Introduction

The inherently discursive and situated characteristics of qualitative data require analysis and discussion to be combined in this chapter, to avoid the abstraction and simplification that would otherwise occur. This chapter will be centred around the theme of 'responsibility', considering the various mechanisms and discourses of the 'actually existing' neoliberalisations of FRM in depth (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The first section concentrates on self-responsibility, and its justification by 'common sense' discourses of resilience. This is followed by a consideration of Partnership Funding and how this legitimizes destructive forms of re-regulation. The final section considers the 'freedoms' of privatization, before finishing with a consideration of Harvey's (2003) 'accumulation by dispossession'.

4.2 Self-Responsibility, Resilience and 'Common Sense'

Self-responsibility here refers to how neoliberalism necessitates self-sufficiency for welfare responsibilities devolved from central government (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). This is apparent in policies including the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, whereby the Lead Local Flood Authority was created as a new institutional actor for the transference of FRM powers and duties, the analysis of which has frequented literature (Begg et al., 2015). Because the *mechanism* of devolution has been frequently analysed, instead this chapter focuses on how this is legitimized through the *discourse* of 'resilience' and the consequences of this for communities. It will judge the creation of 'common sense', first through coercion, and then consent, before understanding how this perpetuates capitalist accumulation.

4.2.1 Uneven Geographies of Development

As suggested in the Literature Review, Property Level Protection (PLP) represents the creation of a new market, particularly for resilience measures. PLP is conceptualised as a 'common sense' option:

> *"A number of basic measures will be sensible for all people in flood risk areas"* (DEFRA, 2004, p.99)

> *"The Government is of the view that, in general, individual building owners should be responsible for improving the flood resilience of their buildings. The benefits for the owner are substantial: lower repair costs following an event, fewer health implications and continued insurance"* (DEFRA, 2004, p.95)

Self-responsibility is portrayed as 'sensible' and universal for 'all people', reasoned by 'substantial' benefits to the homeowner. The 'logical' nature of PLP is highlighted by the implicit threat that without self-responsibility, insurance may be discontinued. This represents Gramsci's (1999) theorization of the coercive creation of 'common sense', not only through threats to insurance, but also through the withdrawal of funds. Simultaneously reducing FRM funding, particularly through Partnership Funding (Section 4.3), while increasing self-responsibility for PLP is perceived to have deleterious impacts on the most disadvantaged:

> "what will happen is...that individuals who...well, with *small* amounts of flooding, individuals who are intelligent or equipped or empowered by whatever means will lessen the risk of flooding, and those who are *not* empowered...not educated, not aware, not financially able, or not *physically* able...will not be able to stop [the flooding]." (Individual)

When asked why these differences existed, the respondent replied:

> "It comes through years of different...it comes through our *class* system, it comes through different socioeconomic um...backgrounds"

Class difference thus perpetuates uneven geographies of development (Smith, 2010), due to different individual capacities to protect against flood risk, producing Rinne and Nygren's (2016) 'risk zones'. Variegated socio-spatial distributions of environmental vulnerabilities serve to shape and reshape class structures throughout society, as those with the lowest capabilities become further disadvantaged through increased flood risk (Nygren, 2016). Risk thus limits individual socio-spatial mobility and autonomy on a disproportionate basis (Prudham, 2007). As such, 'common sense' resilience serves to regulate and "rationalise fate" in the name of uneven development (Hall and O'Shea, 2013; O'Hare et al., 2016, p.1179).

Furthermore, difficulties of delivering individual responsibilities arise owing to confusion regarding FRM responsibilities:

> "And we've seen that with um, the response from the recent flood events as well, that the public...um and communities are still not always clear to who they should speak about particular issues." (Environment Agency)

> "There is confusion, of like, who to go to for help, because it is confusing as to, say if you were about to be flooded or it is flooding, you don't know where the water's coming from." (Flood Charity)

This existence of confusion was reasoned by the following:

"The government will never tell the public that it's their responsibility to manage their own…issues, so they give that problem to local authorities." (Local Authority)

"But they dislike, *consistently* the Environment Agency dislike having discussions with the public or with the, you know, they can be *consistently* evasive." (Consultancy)

Suggested is an asymmetry of information between government agencies and members of the public, owing to state reluctance in sharing information. Swyngedouw (2007) suggests this perpetuates power inequalities, due to unequal opportunities to being informed. While policy documents address community responsibility explicitly, often direct communications are lacking, disadvantaging individuals unlikely to access policy documents. This is exemplified by neoliberalism's general knowledge-based economy, benefitting those with access to education and innovation to a higher degree (Jessop, 2002). FRM institutions assume a "neoliberal presumption of perfect information", with 'resilience' presented as whole and unproblematic (Harvey, 2005, p.68; Donoghue, 2016), demonstrated by the following:

> *"We engage openly with local communities to improve understanding of the risks from flooding and coastal erosion, provide flood warnings, and help develop and promote solutions that make them more resilient to flood events" (Environment Agency, 2014, p.8)*

Processes of devolution are justified by declarative assumptions of absolute information-sharing, and subsequently individual autonomy to meet responsibilities, ignoring the reality of uneven access and capabilities (O'Hare et al., 2016). This acts as a "deliberate obfuscation of processes that will lead to the concentration of wealth and therefore, the restoration of class power" (Harvey, 2005, p.68). This is demonstrated by wider national reforms, including reduced tax credits and benefits for the poorest, in contrast with a reduced top rate of tax for the richest. Therefore, coercing people into PLP ensures that the ruling class possesses favourable access to

information as to how to protect themselves, as well as the means, lacking for the most vulnerable, thus concentrating wealth and class difference further. This is normalized and concealed through the privileging of resilience in neoliberal discourse, defining neoliberal capitalism by the "definite social characteristics stamped upon individuals by the process of social production" (Donoghue, 2016; Marx, 1999, p.606).

The next section develops this further, understanding how discourses of resilience actively embed individualism.

4.2.2 Individualism

Discourses of resilience are bound up in intellectual understandings of 'bounce back':

> "And so from my perspective if we can make them resilient so that they can withstand the flood and be operating very quickly then that, that keeps the country going, keeps the economy going, enables communities to…get back on their feet quickly." (Environment Agency)

> "you've got to, like, if the water comes in, how can I…bounce back to normal, or improve my life, so the definition of resilience, how can I bounce back to a…normal, or better than normal, state." (Flood Charity)

This supports Alexander et al.'s (2016) positive understanding of resilience's adaptability. Such approaches re-articulate resilience, highlighting rational understandings to provide an advantageous and persuasive outlook. Resilient communities are subsequently characterised as knowledgeable and intelligent citizens. This represents Gramsci's (1999) understanding of the importance of intellectuals in the functioning of social hegemony, in this case to legitimise self-responsibility. This supports Harvey's (2005) suggestion of how neoliberal discourse constructs an ideological perception of 'common sense' out of "cultural socialization" to further mobilize neoliberal processes (p.39).

Furthermore, by portraying resilience as 'common sense', individualist discourse is normalized. Consider the following:

"So I think in that case if you buy a house on a floodplain, *knowing* that it's on a floodplain then it serves you right. You pay for its upgrading or whatever protection." (Community Group)

"But the houses being built across the road, everyone knows they're built on a floodplain. Anyone who buys a house there and gets flooded I mean…*can* they actually complain." (Flood Action Group)

Harvey (2005) suggests that "each individual is held accountable for his or her own actions and well-being", understood as such by the public, whereby a lack of flood protection was correlated with foolishness and personal blame (p.65). Individualism is thus inculcated as 'common sense', hiding the real causes for uneven development, namely uneven access to information and class difference (Harvey, 1996). Individualism is further embedded by the portrayal of floods as impossible to prevent, with discourses of 'unpredictability' contrasted with those of 'predictability' and 'protection' of personal responsibility, to take 'ownership' of FRM. For example:

> "It is not possible to prevent all flooding or coastal erosion, but there are actions that can be taken to manage these risks and reduce the impacts on communities. This flood and coastal erosion risk management (FCERM) strategy for England builds on existing approaches to managing risk. It aims to encourage the use of all of the available measures in a co-ordinated way that balances the needs of communities, the economy and the environment" (*Environment Agency, 2011, p.1*)

Such passages play on the intellectual absolute of the impossibility of preventing flood risk, ensuring personal responsibility becomes a 'logical' focus (O'Hare et al., 2016). Resilience is centred around the acceptability of flood risk, rendered governable, in line with policy discourses of 'living with water' (DEFRA, 2004). Also of importance is the lack of agency expressed, with the use of the 'strategy' as a veil for the role of the state in producing change. Instead, action is established as a response to abstract and unpredictable forces of nature, hiding the political and social institutions responsible.

Despite this, the success of individualist discourse is questionable, due to the reality of low uptake of PLP. Moreover, a number of public stakeholder perceptions do not relate to positive 'adaptability' of resilience, but to the motivation of obscuring the *displacement* of responsibility by the state:

> "It's because *they* [the state] don't want the responsibility, and they don't necessarily have the funds." (Local Authority)

> "It's the general strategy these days, pass the buck to somebody else. Let somebody else pay the bills." (Community Group)

> Because that's government policy in all things isn't it, take individual responsibility. I think, I think if you can make people feel like…things are their fault and their responsibility, then that takes away…the need for the government to have to act, doesn't it." (Individual)

Therefore, public stakeholders do not always adopt the same discourse as policy. Instead is continuous struggle and resistance to ideology through the creation of counter-hegemony, representing Gramsci's (1999) 'war of position' in which discourse is 'contaminated' and unaccepted by society (Donoghue, 2016). This epitomises Harvey's (1996) dialectics of discourse, pertaining to the heterogeneity of internalized discourse, due to the variety of values, practices and institutions affecting participants. However, these perceptions remain important in highlighting how there exists 'government at a distance', 'responsibilising' and disciplining individuals into believing the need to protect themselves, through a form of 'regulatory dumping' (Butler and Pidgeon, 2011; Peck and Tickell, 2002).

While localities are responsibilised, the state performs tasks of regulating the subjectivities of those at risk (Welsh, 2014). Hutter et al. (2014) suggest that resilience, portrayed as a common sense 'truth', conceals the real causes for risk exposure and vulnerabilities, managing the consequences of uneven development to maintain the status quo. This consequently creates a 'false consciousness', "profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising real problems under cultural

prejudices", and separate from the reality of destructive decentralization (Harvey, 2005, p.39).

4.2.3 'Common Sense' Capitalist Accumulation

Resilience is also constructed as 'common sense' to allow increased opportunities for capitalist accumulation in the form of PLP markets. This is regulated through government understandings of 'best practice', aiming to create a 'consistent' market moving towards state regulation of an 'approved framework' of suppliers, representing the standardized nature of neoliberal markets (DEFRA, 2014b; Castree, 2011). The state's role as an economic elite is thus apparent, deeply embedded to fulfil capitalist class interests in free markets (Ioris, 2015). As such, state displacement of responsibility not only concentrates wealth through uneven development, but motivates capitalist accumulation practices. PLP is both justified by and perceived to benefit private insurers:

> "It's also a heck of a lot cheaper for insurance companies in the *long* term, and for the local authority, because like if the insurance company has to keep paying out for new stuff every time, that isn't gonna work, work for them. But if they move the plug sockets higher, they won't have to do it again" (Flood Charity)

> *"Insurers are also well placed to incentivise uptake of flood protection products by offering lower premiums to those who install and use them" (DEFRA, 2004, p.95)*

The latter demonstrates the consistent focus on PLP's role in aiding increased competition in insurance markets through price reductions. Such strategies serve to perpetuate and normalise the neoliberal ideology of the 'commodification of everything' (Harvey, 2005). Capitalists are afforded increased power and wealth through new opportunities for competitiveness. PLP markets thus transform 'resilience' into an active mechanism of neoliberalisation, yet still justified by such discourse, demonstrating the inherently dialectical nature of neoliberal capitalism (Harvey, 1996).

PLP is therefore a redistributive effect of neoliberalism in order to "re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites"

(Harvey, 2005, p.19). Individuals are transformed into mere instruments of neoliberalism, re-embedding historical class relations. PLP becomes the "materialisation of the social features of production and the personification of the material foundations of production, which characterise the entire capitalist mode of production", representative of Marx's (1999) historical materialism (p.607). Consistent with Prudham's (2007) theory described in the Literature Review, flood risk (and therefore irresponsibility) is built into regulatory systems of governance through resilience, while "manifestations of resilience catalyse individualized citizen-consumers, expanding the availability of market-based 'solutions' or promoting preparedness and self-organisation, mirroring dominant neoliberal ideologies" (O' Hare et al., 2016, p.1178). Through the naturalization of risk comes the simultaneous naturalization of a lack of flood defence, and the production of new markets.

The next section will conceptualise an understanding of responsibilisation further, through a break-down of the policy of Partnership Funding.

4.3 Re-Regulation: Partnership Funding

As discussed in the Literature Review, neoliberalisation often involves the scaling down of regulation, as a form of 'roll-back' governance, before market-friendly re-regulation comes into place (Castree, 2011). An analysis of Partnership Funding will follow, first understanding how Partnership Funding produces competitive and unequal funding processes, before considering how capitalist interests influence these processes further. Existing literature surrounding Partnership Funding is apparent, although does not critically assess the motivations for re-regulation (Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe, 2015). It is this gap this section will subsequently aim to fill.

4.3.1 'Partnerships' as Entrepreneurship

Partnership Funding possesses the apparent aims of ensuring fairer funding for FRM. As suggested in the Literature Review, the state partly withdraws central Flood Defence Grant-in-Aid (FDGiA) funding, instead requiring local contributions to meet shortfalls. This reduces burden on the taxpayer, thus is justified by a utilitarian concept of justice. Partnership Funding is also justified by the following:

> *"In the past, joint investment in managing flood and coastal risk has benefited communities by…*
> - *fostering trust and co-operation across the activities of various partners. Working with organisations active in your community can provide opportunities to discuss other issues and ideas" (Environment Agency, 2012d, no pagination)*

Discourse of 'partnership' is prevalent to allow for trust, empowerment and inclusion, demonstrating the 'progressive spaces' of neoliberalism (Lewis, 2009). Individuals are persuaded with increased decision-making and influential capacity. Despite this, empowerment is in reality severely constrained. Consider the following:

"There must be suitable governance and management arrangements between partners at the appropriate strategic, programme and project level. These must be proportionate to the value and risk of the proposed investment, but should make sure that the public funding involved is spent appropriately" (Environment Agency, 2012a, p.10)

This represents the managerial style of discourse, portraying a high level of state scrutiny and commercialised practice, including cost-benefit analysis (Bakker, 2007). Davies' (2007) theory that "the rhetoric of empowerment disguises the practice of managerialism" is thus evident, as the increasing 'governmentalisation' of local partnerships becomes mandatory (p.205; Larner and Craig, 2005). While responsibility is devolved, power remains centralized, with strong control over partnership activities by central government, imposing 'best practice' from above. As suggested by Penning-Rowsell and Johnson (2015), "despite attempts to 'hollow out' the state through scaling 'out' and 'down' of FRM responsibilities…the control over the modalities of power retention in this context remain highly concentrated and centralized" (p.132). This represents a dialectical process of 'creative destruction' as defined by Brenner and Theodore (2002), in which there exists 'destruction' of former institutional arrangements, such as the reduction of previous FDGiA money, justified by apparent state failure to deliver services affordably. Then comes the creation of new neoliberal infrastructure, in the form of the 'roll out' of partnerships (Peck and Tickell, 2002).

Partnerships are constrained by neoliberal objectives, as a large proportion of government guidance surrounds the need to develop local entrepreneurialism:

"we will continue to work with LEPs [Local Enterprise Partnerships] *on their strategies and investment plans to help identify partnership funding opportunities for local flood risk improvements"* (Environment Agency, 2014, pp.29-30)

"A new mix of skills and knowledge from all the organisations involved will be needed so that they can identify potential beneficiaries, develop successful partnerships and secure contributions" (Environment Agency, 2012a, p.14)

Emphases on securing contributions and LEPs, which promote partnerships between local authorities and businesses, define the individualistic and competitive nature of Partnership Funding. Securing contributions is dependent on individual 'skills and knowledge', demonstrating the neoliberal trend of "encouraging entrepreneurial initiative" to responsibilise local stakeholders (Harvey, 2005, p.23). Despite this, negative opinions of the competitive nature of Partnership Funding were common:

> "There's an awful lot of *hoops* to jump through to *get* Partnership Funding. Umm…and I understand it, but I don't think it's necessarily the best way of distributing the money. It seems a little…he who shouts loudest, gets most, for want of a better expression." (Emergency Services)

> "But…um…it can probably make it difficult, because you only need one of the partnerships to say, that's not where I see my priorities, which will happen if Swindon see it so important to Swindon. But they don't have any *money*, but the Environment Agency say well, three towns down the road is a much more worthy case, better not give it to Swindon, better give it to Oxford. Then we've lost out, but if you live in Oxford you've gained. So it's…it's…*politics*…in serious subjects." (Flood Action Group)

Therefore, competitive processes of funding allocation are perceived to reduce equity in distribution. Varied individual capacities perpetuate the creation of local elites with greater access to decision-making - "he who shouts loudest, gets most", supporting Geddes' (2006) theory. The entrepreneurial nature of partnerships thus highlights Marx's (2013) understanding of the capitalist intention to "promulgate the doctrine that accumulation of capital is the first duty of every citizen" (p.411). This is perceived to create further inequalities:

> "You can't expect communities to actually dip into their pocket and pay towards flood defences. Some places they *do*, if you've got a wealthier community then that's a good place to do it. But if you're less well off, the most socially deprived do get funding, they they're given a certain weighting so they're ok, but it's, it's the middle of the road people that will…and smaller communities that will miss out." (Mary Dhonau)

Therefore, competition for funding produces uneven results between localities, which reflects prevailing patterns of deprivation (Begg et al., 2015). This exacerbates class difference and concentrates wealth, due to control of decision-making processes by local elites with the capability to abide by the state's individualistic regulation, as well as the uneven distribution of wealth, giving the ruling class the means to protect themselves. Historical social relations are therefore re-materialised, with struggle suppressed by the construction of consent of neoliberal 'partnership' ideologies (Harvey, 2005). The individualistic nature of Partnership Funding ensures deficiencies in FRM are ascribed to personal failures, owing to the inability to secure contributions, inevitably linked with class relations (*ibid.*).

Through continued centralization of power, the state's role is "to administer the class society in the interests of the ruling class" (Smith, 2010, p.61). Discourses of 'partnership' and 'empowerment' falsely promise increased democracy. The state thus embeds a 'false consciousness' in the form of a "communitarian ideology of a potentially cohesive local community", denying the "social fragmentation wrought by turbulence in a market-driven economy" (Geddes, 2006, pp.83-84). The creation of uneven geographies of development is nevertheless only the first stage, with partnerships also propagating capitalist interests more explicitly, discussed in the next section (Smith, 2010).

4.3.2 'Partnerships' as Capitalistic

One transport authority suggested that Partnership Funding served only to reduce state funding, rather than to create more effective approaches to FRM:

> "the cynics might say it's a different way of cutting funding, you know…here you go, who's to say, you know we might have had £300 million this time, you know next time round they might say you know, we'll give you £150 million and we want you to match fund it to £300 million, you know. And that's a different way of…of creating localism isn't it, but it's a different sort of *force*. Y-y-you know….it creates a different sort of pressure, tension…"

Here, Partnership Funding is perceived to *displace* responsibility for funding onto communities, 'responsibilising' them to act as 'flanking mechanisms' for the reduced

services that state withdrawal creates (Jessop, 2002). Therefore, there exists 'government at a distant' as previous funding regulations are 'rolled back' (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). In the process, new funding arrangements are 'created', in which criteria is based on capitalist interests (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). This is perpetuated by the state's determination of a 'multiple benefits' approach to partnerships. This has grown considerably more concerned with economic benefits over time, as shown by the following passages:

> *"Working in partnership with others is essential where contributions are needed to achieve FCERM outcomes. Investing in FCERM infrastructure and assets can also realise benefits beyond those directly related to reducing flooding and coastal erosion risks. Non-FCERM benefits are not used to help justify the levels of FDGiA. However, they can be an incentive for others to contribute" (Environment Agency, 2012a, p.15)*

> *"Once those who benefit from FCERM projects are identified, it should be possible to connect different parties with each other, as well as with organisations with infrastructure and asset investment plans. This will help identify wider benefits that FCERM solutions can enable, such as economic growth and opportunities that can benefit businesses, authorities, communities and the local environment" (Environment Agency, 2012a, p.15)*

While funding is not provided for non-FCERM benefits, their use in incentivising funding is crucial. It is interesting that the use of 'others' demonstrates a clear lack of agency, yet apparent in other policy documents is the explicit need to incentivise *private* companies to provide funding contributions, for example:

> *"We will know we're succeeding when…*

>> • *Investment in flood and coastal erosion risk management increases from the private sector and other non-central government sources"* *(Environment Agency, 2014, p.14)*

> *"Therefore, overall investment, by the private and public sectors combined, needs to keep pace with pressures over the medium to long-term to avoid flood risk and rates of coastal erosion increasing over time" (Environment Agency, 2011, p.35)*

This is further confirmed by the views of the Environment Agency interviewee:

> "At the moment it still seems to be public funding that comes into that Partnership Funding, and I would like to see more private funding coming in. Um, we've done quite well in some locations um, but we need to get better at that"

Partnerships therefore represent a desire for increased public-private co-operation. This growth in private capacity is fundamental to neoliberal capitalism. It is suggested here, however, that this is primarily to allow private and capitalist interests to be influential within decision-making. This is demonstrated by the following:

> *"Those that live or have an interest in the areas at risk should have a bigger say in what gets done, in return for greater local and private contributions towards the benefits delivered" (Environment Agency, 2011, p.36)*

> *"The degree of scrutiny involved in all Environment Agency review processes is proportionate, and in particular a lighter touch approach will be taken in cases where the FDGiA contribution represents a small proportion of overall project costs" (Environment Agency, 2012a, p.12)*

This represents the *conditional* nature of 'democratic' decision-making, in which those with greater wealth, particularly private stakeholders, are afforded greater power to assert their interests. This is hinted at by the following participant:

> "Whenever it comes to partnership funding, or umm…partnership working, we're always going to be up against it because we're a non-profit organisation, and they're all profit making organisations." (Local Authority)

The perception of being "up against it" clearly aligns with a common theme regarding the difficulties of navigating opposing public/private motivations, further constrained by the fact that:

> "it's also about where the different funding streams come in as well, and how much *money* these people have to do these things as well" (Flood Charity)

Partnership Funding therefore favours those with more capacity to provide funding contributions, connoting the ruling class with greatest wealth, inevitably directing decision-making towards the neoliberal capitalist agenda (Davies, 2007). For the ruling class therefore, there exists reduced transparency, and a higher degree of local decision-making, connoting actual decentralization and 'empowerment' that Partnership Funding supposedly represents (*ibid.*). Thus, the power of the ruling class is exemplified.

As suggested by Geddes (2006), partnerships are based on principles of increased privatization of FRM, while public sector involvement is further limited by resource and funding demands. Partnerships limit the autonomy of those likely to challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism, signifying an implicit form of state 'coercion' through violent and destructive reform (Gramsci, 1999). Instead, partnerships undermine democracy, "while limiting local policy options to those consistent with the neoliberal agenda" (Geddes, 2006, p.93). Thus, not only does the state re-produce patterns of uneven development, but purposefully encourages the rule of capitalist class interest.

The next section will consider privatization and how it changes FRM responsibilities.

This section will discuss two main themes. The first of these demonstrates ideologies of 'freedom' and 'autonomy', which the policy of Flood Re promulgates. Literature on this is sparse, and does not utilize a neoliberal analysis (Penning-Rowsell, 2015). Following this is a brief discussion of the applicability of Harvey's (2003) 'accumulation by dispossession', often found in neoliberal analyses (see Glassman, 2006), but lacking in discussions of FRM, thus necessary for inclusion. It will be framed by a discussion of maintenance responsibilities for flood assets, namely Sustainable Urban Drainage systems (SuDs).

4.4.1 Freedom

As acknowledged in the Literature Review, the Statement of Principles and associated public-private relationships have shaped the UK's flood insurance market. A contradictory approach to literature on the privatization of nature (Glassman, 2007; McCarthy, 2004) will be used here, with the focus on the phase *after* privatization, in which Flood Re has been brought in to encourage personal responsibility to help the transition to a risk-based system of pricing (Penning-Rowsell, 2015).

Flood Re has been dominated with discourse regarding the apparent correlation between free competition of the flood insurance market with 'freedom of choice' for individuals. For instance:

*"In most private markets, price and, therefore, affordability is driven by the presence of **competition**. With engaged consumers making informed decisions over the products and services they buy, firms are incentivised to **improve products and drive prices down through efficiency and innovation.** In short, in a competitive market, prices will be lower than would otherwise be the case.*

*This has been seen in recent years in the UK home insurance market, where competition has driven reductions in average premiums. Well over 650 insurers are currently authorised to underwrite household policies in the market and 20.2 million policies were written in 2014. However, in contrast to the overall market, households in flood risk areas have had a relatively **limited choice** of cover for flood risks.*

*This was one of the major drivers for the creation of Flood Re and its introduction should serve to increase competition. Given that Premium Thresholds are currently set at below risk-reflective levels for high risk properties, **more insurers should be able to enter the market** and households living in high risk areas should **have access to more options** when searching for a home insurance quote". (Flood Re, 2016, p.36 [emboldened parts added])*

The presence of Flood Re is legitimized by the need to 'open up' the flood insurance market, to increase 'competition' and give households increased 'options' and 'access'. Such language connotes ideologies of freedom and choice, as individuals are set 'free' through their incorporation into markets. This allows for the construction of consent for the ideology of free markets, with Harvey (2005) suggesting that discourse of 'freedom' serves to "protect and even restore" capitalist class interests (p.42). Drawing on Polanyi's (2001) contributions, it can be said that this is illusionary, as the individual is in fact subject to authoritarian market rules of the insurance industry, based on quantification and monetization of risk.

Despite this, a risk-reflective system of pricing is suggested by some to provide greater opportunities for justice in FRM:

> "Um, I think, and that [risk-based pricing] is quite a fair way of dealing with it." (Housing Association)

> "I think there's lots of people that pay house insurance that don't actually claim, so I think the bigger question would be is, if you've got someone whose house floods and then their premium, you're trying to keep down so that they maintain insurance, you get someone else who's never really claimed, has to sort of have higher premiums. Then I can see people getting a bit upset" (Emergency Services)

This is representative of utilitarianism, transferring burden from the general taxpayer to the 'beneficiary' of FRM, and guaranteeing greatest return to shareholders (Thaler and Hartmann, 2016). A libertarian justice approach is also evidenced by Flood Re, in which the free market provides freedom of choice and incentivises self-help, paramount due to rising risk according to Penning-Rowsell and Priest (2015). Despite such positive understandings, the 'freedom' of the insurance market is questionable:

> "I think that they should have *something*, you know because you've got, there's that many people that I know of that physically *cannot* get insurance, because of the risk that they are in in that particular area. And you know, more and more people are going to be *in* those areas if we are going to get the kind of climate and rainfall that we're having recently" (Transport Authority)

> "I mean the problem *is* some insurance companies won't insure some houses and businesses, won't they, and…that, that's difficult, even if they *did* put in property level flood protection" (Mary Dhonau)

Such comments suggest the consistent *lack* of autonomy of the flood insurance market. Society and working classes are constrained, neither free to protect themselves from flood risk, due to the unaffordability or unobtainability of flood insurance, nor free from exploitative capitalist accumulation. Marx (1999) suggested the necessity of such conditions as a prerequisite for the creation of the capitalist mode of production. In this case, the class hierarchy of society is a necessity for the functioning of a transition to a risk-based system of pricing, based on the ability (or

dis-ability) of individuals to address their own vulnerabilities, in which the level of protection is reduced as a 'punishment' for a lack of individual action, producing profit for insurers. It is interesting to note briefly here also the contradiction between Flood Re's focus on reduced sharing of risk, as opposed to Partnership Funding's basis of sharing decision-making. Such contradictory and selective justification represents the variegated effects of processes that Harvey's (1996) dialectics propose.

Marx (2013) also understood that consciousness was "nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind", determined by social conditions and governing laws (p.15). It is argued here therefore that Flood Re serves to alienate individuals through their presupposition as an instrument of neoliberalism, separated from the realities of class hierarchies, state displacement of responsibility and the uneven geographies of development that follow, through the veil of the 'choice' and 'freedom' that Flood Re provides. Consciousness is thus homogenized, creating false truths as 'common sense', when "the inequalities and the class basis of property ownership that define the production process are dissolved in the market where buyer and seller confront each other as equals. Everyone is a consumer" (Smith, 2010, p.76). Flood Re hence serves to conceal, and thus continue, unequal class relations between the individual and the insurer.

Analysis must however, consider the state, owing to McCarthy's (2004) recognition of its role in maintaining conditions of production. Consider the following two passages:

*"The expiration of the Statement of Principles and the advances in flood mapping, combined with the rising risks of flooding highlighted above, meant that the availability and affordability of household flood insurance looked likely to become a **widening and deepening economic and social problem. This situation provided the backdrop to the creation of Flood Re**" (Flood Re, 2016, p.22 [emboldened parts added])*

*"Flood Re has been set up to tackle a public policy issue and will act as a public body. This means that, while it is an **industry-run, industry-led and industry-owned company**, as well as being regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), it also has **direct accountability** to Parliament both for achieving the policy objectives set out in legislation, and for its custodianship of public money" (Flood Re, 2016, p.23 [emboldened parts added])*

Continuing public-private relations are justified by the apparently inevitable social problems otherwise, commonplace in justifications of privatization, providing a 'backdrop' for Flood Re. Thus, "after privatization, a state-controlled regulatory institutional framework invariably has to be implemented, just to make sure that companies enjoying a 'natural' monopoly condition 'behave in competitive ways'" (Swyngedouw, 2007, p.56). Framing Flood Re as a 'public body' despite its 'industry-run, industry-led and industry-owned' nature legitimizes it as a 'for the people' initiative, hiding its exploitative nature. Therefore, "the state has long been and continues to be the fundamental agent in the dynamics of global capitalism", constraining the actual 'freedoms' of the market through neoliberal interventions (Harvey, 2003, p.92).

4.4.2 Accumulation by Dispossession

It is argued henceforth that capital assets associated with FRM, particularly concerning SuDs, represent a technique in which FRM is becoming increasingly privatized. This is accomplished through implicit techniques of governance in which there results the need for private management of SuDs, through purposefully disparate and inefficient responsibilisation of public stakeholders.

Policy has in the past has failed to explicitly responsibilise developers. Consider the following:

> *"New properties completed, or existing buildings converted into housing, after 1 January 2012 will not have an influence on the allocation of national funding to projects. As a result, local responsibilities are reinforced for decisions taken over the nature and location of development. The Pitt Review said developers "*should make a full contribution towards the costs both of building and maintaining any necessary defences*"". (Environment Agency, 2011, p.37)*

'Local responsibilities' in general receive a strong focus, nevertheless the only information regarding specifically developer responsibilities is that which has been recommended in the Pitt Review. Such use of the 'Pitt Review' is abstract and assumes a lack of agency, failing to explicitly bind developers to maintenance responsibilities. Oft cited reasons for this within interviews were ascribed to housing priorities reducing the ability to restrict developments on the basis of flood risk. Furthermore, the nature of developers as private companies was often seen as restrictive on the level of defence, for example:

"developers will turn round and if, if we put too much, too many er, hurdles in their way, it's uneconomic for them to then develop. So, it's a fine, er sort of balancing act between…*how* much you can actually gain for community gain, before it actually becomes uneconomical to develop the land." (Neighbouring Authority)

"They're not going to *do* it unless they get money out of it, but unfortunately that's the world of the private, so industry…you know there *has* to be some commercial element to why they'd do it. And at that particular point you're starting to make compromises about what you *actually* should do and what's economically viable." (Landowner)

"developers are all about the pounds, shillings and pence. And unless they *have* to do something, they just won't do it." (Housing Association)

There is thus extensive evidence suggesting how a lack of public enforcement, and the private nature of developers, leads to an absence of the provision and maintenance of flood defence. Responsibilities are left to a disparate range of public bodies, particularly individuals, landowners and local authorities. Such bodies lack profit motive to maintain assets, as well as capacity or resource due to funding cuts, meaning maintenance is absent. Strategies invoked in response to this are thus important for analysis, in which there exists the privatization of SuDs assets and their maintenance, evidenced by increased out-sourcing to private companies. Of particular note was one suggestion by a Water Company:

Participant 1: "Um, I've always thought, that if we *carry* on the way we are in 20 years' time, we'll probably have private sewers for SuDs. You'll have…"

Participant 2: "Exactly, I was thinking it was going to be a big adoption, like private sewers being adopted by water companies recently. Private sewers and private pumping stations, we're going to have private SuDs."

(Further on in discussion)

Participant 1: "Yeah, so I can see a time, it's that starting impetus. If you start to generate for these assets, then it does become cost effective for *us* to maintain"

Such moves, or predicted moves, to private maintenance are representative of Harvey's (2003) 'accumulation by dispossession', by which public bodies are dispossessed of SuDs resources and connected maintenance activities, and accumulated in turn by private capital, composed of management companies and water companies. This perpetuates the privatization of previously open access regimes of provision and maintenance, and thus the transfer of entitlements, for the purpose of accelerating the commodification of SuDs assets (McCarthy, 2004). Contradictorily, the role of the state is not in legislature as customary, but in the reluctance to produce such legislature, representing its role in supporting capitalist class interests (Harvey, 2005). Through lacking implementation of maintenance by developers, privatization becomes the 'logical' focus. It is here that an interesting contradiction arises – in 'responsibilising' private stakeholders, there exists the advantage of reduced disparity of responsibilities, leading to improved co-ordination of FRM, and reduced burden on individuals to maintain SuDs assets on their property. This supports views by authors including Geaves and Penning-Rowsell (2016) regarding the advantages of privatization.

However, already noted by participants were the negative implications of private management:

> "Oh yeah so another problem is, say that the development company puts a maintenance company in place to do it, what if that maintenance company folds or leaves" (Flood Charity)

This leads to the 'destruction' of assets as they are turned over for private management, suggested by Heynen and Perkins (2007), as maintenance capacities are unfulfilled. Despite this, observed consequences are in their infancy, and further critical focus will be required to protect against negative consequences. Therefore, to finish, in the words of Polanyi (2001), "to allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment…would result in the demolition of society" (pg.76).

Chapter 5 – Conclusions

5.1 Main Findings

5.2 Practical Implications

5.3 Theoretical Implications

5.4 Limitations and Further Research

5. Conclusions

5.1 Main Findings

Neoliberalism has materialised in complex and multiple forms in FRM, but is inescapably defined by its deleterious societal impacts of uneven development. 'Resilience' naturalizes the 'inevitability' of flood risk, and thus the logic of self-sufficiency, as neoliberal individualist ideologies become inculcated as 'common sense' through Gramsci's (1999) practices of consent and coercion. The uneven access to information creates uneven geographies of development, re-embedding class difference as the most disadvantaged in society have the least capacity to fulfil self-responsibility. Despite this, some understood resilience as a strategy of displacement, demonstrating the occurrence of active resistance. Even so, the marketization of resilience through PLP perpetuates capitalist accumulation and the creation of wealth for the ruling classes, supporting a Marxist philosophy.

Self-responsibility is further embedded through Partnership Funding, normalizing entrepreneurial and competitive funding processes through discourses of 'partnership' and 'empowerment', contradicted by the reality of the centralization of power. Individualistic policy terms recreate uneven development through reduced equity of distribution, and thus participants believed that local elites and wealthier communities are the main beneficiaries of Partnership Funding. Combined with the clear motivation to increase private capitalist power in decision-making processes through a conditional conceptualisation of democracy, Partnership Funding inevitably concentrates power and wealth.

Flood Re, conceptualised as the phase *after* privatization, is imbued with discourse of 'freedom', clearly aligned with understandings of those such as Harvey (2005) and Polanyi (2001). Despite this, perceptions understood the insurance market as highly constrained, with an actual *lack* of autonomy, due to the use of 'freedom' in veiling the capitalist necessity of class difference to embed a risk-based system of pricing. Flood Re thus demonstrates the materialisation of historical class relations through the homogenization of a 'false consciousness'.

Harvey's (2003) accumulation by dispossession materialises in the privatization, or predicted privatization, of SuDs assets, through the deliberate creation of disparate responsibilities for their maintenance. Most important is the state's role in *not* producing legislation, ensuring privatization appears as the 'logical' solution. The role of the state in the operation of ruling class interests was found throughout, in the regulation of PLP and insurance markets, as well as re-regulation through Partnership Funding. Employed through discourse was a libertarian or utilitarian justice approach, supported by perceptions of the advantages of privatization, particularly regarding flood insurance.

Overall, through complex and sometimes contradictory mechanisms and discourses, the neoliberalisation of FRM is apparent, changing the distribution of responsibilities for FRM in Swindon by 'responsibilising' more local and private actors. This is through self-responsibility and 'resilience', re-regulation and 'partnerships', and privatization and 'freedom'. Concentration of wealth is evidenced throughout, encouraged by the state, leading to inevitably negative outcomes.

5.2 Practical Implications

Castree (2007) and Fairclough (2001) reject neoliberal analyses unable to suggest feasible alternatives to criticised existing arrangements, representing merely 'utopianism'. While this dissertation is limited in the extent to which comprehensive solutions can be formalised, an awareness of these ensures grounded neoliberal research. Therefore, public confusion regarding responsibilities, due to uneven access to information, could be addressed through increased sharing of information and public engagement. Partnerships based more on egalitarianism than entrepreneurialism, and moves *away* from risk-based pricing of insurance, should be considered for policy alternatives which address uneven vulnerabilities and inaccessibility of partnerships and insurance markets.

This work also demonstrates the possibility of a radical break from the current capitalist system, due to the perpetuation of uneven development in neoliberal FRM. This has extensive practical and social implications, in the introduction of alternative redistributive and egalitarian principles of justice, the possibilities of empowerment

through resistance, combatting unequal power relations and destructive 'common sense' ideologies, and the re-introduction of welfare. The state would be afforded more responsibility for providing equal distribution of protection, replacing neoliberalisation in the interest of capitalist power.

5.3 Theoretical Implications

Critical analysis of the logics and outcomes of the neoliberalisation of FRM addresses the dearth of such understandings of FRM, previously void of critical scrutiny, while adding to the growing research of the neoliberalisation of nature (Heynen et al., 2007). This contribution's utilisation of a Marxist analysis is also necessary to ensure the continued exposition of otherwise apparently innocuous restructurings. Furthermore, the investigation's focus on specific neoliberal mechanisms and discourses within FRM is sparse elsewhere, thus adding to each respective discussion with a critical evidence-based approach. This is invaluable for future conceptualisations of FRM, neoliberalisation and neoliberal capitalism, aligned with journals such as Capitalism-Nature-Society, and Environment and Planning.

5.4 Limitations and Further Research

While a focus on the complexity of neoliberalism is apparent in this dissertation, it remains limited due to the lack of interrogation into the "what, how and why of commonality and difference between the various real world cases" (Castree, 2007, p.284). Post-Marxist critique should be embraced through cross-case comparisons of neoliberal nature (Graham, 1988). Further research must therefore ensure multi-volume comparisons with this study to avoid generalizations. This could also be developed through the use of various methodologies, such as Rinne and Nygren's (2016) media discourse analysis, through a geographically broader study, or through a broader consideration of all matters raised by participants that could not be taken forward after coding, including the commercialisation of FRM.

Post-Marxist critiques emphasise the importance of human agency and resistance to exploitative capitalist practices. Watts (2007) understands the importance of this in wide-ranging analyses that appreciate the resistance that can occur in society. While the scope of this dissertation limits the extent to which this could be investigated,

further research could focus more closely on localism and empowerment, for example through Flood Action Groups, to understand resistance and recognize individuals as active agents.

Reference List

Alexander, M., Priest, S. and Mees, H. (2016) 'A framework for evaluating flood risk governance', *Environment Science and Policy*, 64, pp.38-47.

Bakker, K. (2007) 'Neoliberalizing nature? Market environmentalism in water supply in England and Wales' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.101-113.

Barnett, C. (2005) 'The consolidations of 'neoliberalism'', *Geoforum*, 36 (1), pp.7-12.

Begg, C., Walker, G. and Kuhlicke, C. (2015) 'Localism and flood risk management in England: the creation of new inequalities?', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 33 (4), pp.685-702.

Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002) 'Cities and the Geographies of "Actually Existing Neoliberalism"', *Antipode*, 34 (3), pp.349-379.

Butler, C. and Pidgeon, N. (2011) 'From 'Flood Defence' to 'Flood Risk Management': Exploring Governance, Responsibility, and Blame', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 29 (3), pp.533-547.

Castree, N. (2006) 'From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolidations, confusions and necessary illusions', *Environment and Planning A,* 38 (1), pp.1-6.

Castree, N. (2007) 'Neoliberal Ecologies' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.281-286.

Castree, N. (2008) 'Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation', *Environment and Planning A,* 40 (1), pp.131-152.

Castree, N. (2010a) 'Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 'Neoliberalism' is and What Difference Nature Makes to it', *Geography Compass*, 4 (12), pp.1725-1733.

Castree, N. (2010b) 'Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 2: Theorising the Neoliberalisation of Nature', *Geography Compass*, 4 (12), pp.1734-1746.

Castree, N. (2011) 'Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 3: Putting Theory into Practice', *Geography Compass*, 5 (1), pp.35-49.

Cho, J.Y. and Lee, E.H. (2014) 'Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative Content Analysis: Similarities and Differences', *The Qualitative Report*, 19 (64), pp.1-20.

Cook, I. and Crang, M. (1995) *Doing Ethnographies*. Norwich: University of East Anglia.

Corbin, J.M. and Strauss, A. (1990) 'Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons and evaluative criteria', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 19 (6), pp.418-427.

Davies, A., Hoggart, K. and Lees, L. (2002) 'Intensive Interviews' in *Researching Human Geography*. London: Routledge, pp.204-213.

Davies, J. S. (2007) 'Against "Partnership": Toward a Local Challenge to Global Neoliberalism' in Hambleton, R. and Gross, J.S. *Governing Cities in a Global Era*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. pp.199-210.

DeLyser, D. and Sui, D. (2014) 'Crossing the qualitative-quantitative chasm III: Enduring methods, open geography, participatory research, and the fourth paradigm', *Progress in Human Geography*, 38 (2), pp.294-307.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2004) *Making space for water*. London: DEFRA. Available at: http://www.look-up.org.uk/2013/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Making-space-for-water.pdf (Accessed: 12 December 2016).

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2012) *Obtaining flood insurance in high risk areas*. London: DEFRA. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69578/pb13082-flood-insurance.pdf (Accessed: 12 December 2016)

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2014a) *A short guide to Flood Re*. London: DEFRA. Available at:

https://consult.defra.gov.uk/flooding/floodreinsurancescheme/supporting_document s/A%20short%20guide%20to%20Flood%20Re.pdf (Accessed: 8 January 2017).

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2014b) *Post-Installation Effectiveness of Property Level Flood Protection*. London: DEFRA. Available at: http://www.nationalfloodforum.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Post-InstallationEffectivenessofPropertyLevelFloodProtection.pdf (Accessed: 27 December 2016).

Dey, I. (2005) *Qualitative Data Analysis*. London and New York: Routledge.

Donoghue, M. (2016) 'Cohesion as 'common sense': Everyday narratives of community and cohesion in New Labour's Britain', *Politics*, 36 (3), pp.262-276.

East Anglia Coastal Group (2014) *What is Partnership Funding?* East Anglia: East Anglia Coastal Group. pp.1-3. Available at: http://www.eacg.org.uk/Docs/PF/What_is_PF.pdf (Accessed: 9 September 2016).

Environment Agency (2009) *Thames Catchment Flood Management Plan Summary Report*. Bristol: EA. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293 903/Thames_Catchment_Flood_Management_Plan.pdf (Accessed: 27 July 2016).

Environment Agency (2011) *Understanding the risks, empowering communities, building resilience: the national flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy for England*. Bristol: EA. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228 898/9780108510366.pdf (Accessed: 15 December 2016).

Environment Agency (2012a) *Principles for implementing flood and coastal resilience funding partnerships*. Bristol: EA. Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http:/cdn.environment-agency.gov.uk/lit_6696_f143f7.pdf (Accessed: 17 October 2016)

Environment Agency (2012b) *Partnership Pays: a short guide for developers and private investors*. Bristol: EA. Available at:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://cdn.environment-agency.gov.uk/flho0312bwdl-e-e.pdf (Accessed: 20 October 2016).

Environment Agency (2012c) *Partnership Pays: a short guide for local authorities and internal drainage boards*. Bristol: EA. Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://cdn.environment-agency.gov.uk/flho0312bwdm-e-e.pdf (Accessed: 20 October 2016).

Environment Agency (2012d) *Partnership Pays: a short guide for local communities*. Bristol: EA. Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://cdn.environment-agency.gov.uk/flho0312bwdn-e-e.pdf (Accessed: 20 October 2016).

Environment Agency (2014) *Corporate Plan 2014 to 2016*. Bristol: EA. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/402873/Environment_Agency_Corporate_Plan_2014-16.pdf (Accessed: 4 August 2016).

Fairclough, N. (1989) *Language and Power*. London and New York: Longman Group UK Limited.

Fairclough, N. (1992) 'Doing Discourse Analysis' in *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.225-240.

Fairclough, N. (2001) 'Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research' in Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage Publications, pp.121-136.

Fairclough, N. (2013) 'Discourse, social theory, and social research: the discourse of welfare reform' in *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. 2nd edn. Old Tappan: Taylor and Francis. pp.167-201.

Flood and Water Management Act 2010, c.29. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/29/pdfs/ukpga_20100029_en.pdf (Accessed: 27 December 2016).

Flood Re (2016) *The first Flood Re transition plan*. Available at: http://www.nationalfloodforum.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Flood-Re-Transition-Plan-Feb-2016-FINAL..pdf (Accessed: 3 July 2016).

Foster, J.B. (2000) *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Geaves, L.H. and Penning-Rowsell, E.C. (2016) 'Flood Risk Management as a public or private good, and the implications for stakeholder engagement', *Environmental Science and Policy*, 55 (2), pp.281-291.

Geddes, M. (2006) 'Partnership and the Limits to Local Governance in England: Institutional Analysis and Neoliberalism', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30 (1), pp.76-94.

Giddens, A. (1995) *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. 2nd edn. Basingstoke and London: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Glassman, J. (2006) 'Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumulation by 'extra-economic' means', *Progress in Human Geography*, 30 (5), pp.608-625.

Glassman, J. (2007) 'Neoliberal primitive accumulation' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences.* Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.94-98.

Goldstein, P. and Natoli, J. (2004) 'Introduction' in *Post-Marxist Theory*. New York: SUNY Press, pp.1-22.

Graham, J. (1988) 'Post-modernism and Marxism', *Antipode*, 20 (1), pp.60-66.

Gramsci, A. (1999) *Selections From The Prison Notebooks*. London: The Electric Book Company Ltd. Available at: http://abahlali.org/files/gramsci.pdf (Accessed: 12 December 2016).

Hajer, M. and Versteeg, W. (2005) 'A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives', *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, 7 (3), pp.175-184.

Hall, S. and O'Shea, A. (2013) 'Common-sense neoliberalism', *Soundings*, 55, pp.9-25.

Harvey, D. (1996) *Justice, Nature & The Geography of Difference.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Harvey, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, W.S. (2011) 'Strategies for conducting elite interviews', *Qualitative Interview*, 11 (4), pp.431-441.

Heynen, N. and Perkins, H.A. (2007) 'Scalar dialectics in green: urban private property and the contradictions of the neoliberalization of nature' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.190-201.

Heynen, N. and Robbins, P. (2006) 'The Neoliberalization of Nature: Governance, Privatization, Enclosure and Valuation', *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 16 (1), pp.5-8.

Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (2007) 'Introduction: false promises' in (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.1-21.

Hutter, G., Leibenath, M. and Mattissek, A. (2014) 'Governing Through Resilience? Exploring Flood Protection in Dresden, Germany', *Social Sciences*, 3 (2), pp.272-287.

Ioris, A.A.R. (2015) 'Theorizing state-environment relationships: Antinomies of flexibility and legitimacy', *Progress in Human Geography*, 39 (2), pp.167-184.

Jessop, B. (2002) 'Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective', *Antipode*, 34 (3), pp.452-472.

Johnson, C., Penning-Rowsell, E. and Parker, D. (2007) 'Natural and imposed injustices: the challenges in implementing 'fair' flood risk management policy in England', *Geographical Journal*, 173 (4), pp.374-390.

Joseph, J. (2013) 'Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach', *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses*, 1 (1), pp.38-52.

Larner, W. and Craig, D. (2005) 'After Neoliberalism? Community Activism and Local Partnerships in Aotearoa New Zealand', *Antipode,* 37 (3), pp.402-424.

Lewis, N. (2009) 'Progressive spaces of neoliberalism?', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint,* 50 (2), pp.113-119.

Liverman, D. (2008) 'Who Governs at What Scale and at What Price? Geography, Environmental Governance and the Commodification of Nature', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 94 (4), pp.734-738.

Mark, K. (1999) *Capital: Volume III.* New York: International Publishers. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf (Accessed: 17 August 2016).

Mark, K. (2013) *Capital: Volumes One and Two*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited.

Marx, K. and Engles, F. (1968) *A Critique of The German Ideology*. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_The_German_Ideology.pdf (Accessed: 16 July 2016).

McCarthy, J. (2004) 'Privatizing conditions of production: trade agreements as neoliberal environmental governance', *Geoforum,* 35 (3), pp.327-341.

McCarthy, J. and Prudham, S. (2004) 'Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism', *Geoforum*, 35 (2), pp.275-283.

Mikecz, R. (2012) 'Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues', *Qualitative Inquiry*, 18 (6), pp.482-493.

Mohammad, R. and Sidaway, J.D. (2013) 'Fieldwork amid geographies of openness and closure', *Area*, 45 (4), pp.433-435.

Nygren, A. (2016) 'Socially Differentiated Urban Flood Governance in Mexico: Ambiguous Negotiations and Fragmented Contestations', *Journal of Latin American Studies,* 48 (2), pp.335-365.

O'Hare, P., White, I. and Connelly, A. (2016) 'Insurance as maladaptation: Resilience and the 'business as usual' paradox', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,* 34 (6), pp.1175-1193.

Oels, A. (2013) 'Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency',*Geoforum*, 45, pp.17-29.

Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) 'Neoliberalizing Space', *Antipode*, 34 (3), pp.380-404.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. (2015) 'Flood insurance in the UK: a critical perspective', *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water*, 2 (6), pp.601-608.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. and Johnson, C. (2015) 'The ebb and flow of power: British flood risk management and the politics of scale', *Geoforum*, 62, pp.131-142.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. and Pardoe, J. (2015) 'The distributional consequences of future flood risk management in England and Wales', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 33 (5), pp.1301-1321.

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. and Priest, S.J. (2015) 'Sharing the burden of increasing flood risk: who pays for flood insurance and flood risk management in the United Kingdom', *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*, 20 (6), pp.991-1009.

Polanyi, K. (2001) *The Great Transformation*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press. Available at: http://inctpped.ie.ufrj.br/spiderweb/pdf_4/Great_Transformation.pdf (Accessed: 17 September 2016).

Primrose, D. (2013) 'Contesting Capitalism in the Light of the Crisis: a Conversation with David Harvey', *The Journal of Australian Political Economy*, 71, pp.5-25.

Prudham, S. (2007) 'Poisoning the well: neoliberalism and the contamination of municipal water in Walkerton, Ontario' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.163-176.

Rabia, A. (2015) 'Rethinking representation: negotiating positionality, power and space in the field', *Gender, Place and Culture*, 22 (6), pp.783-800.

Rehmann, J. (2015) 'Ideology-Critique with the Conceptual Hinterland of a Theory of the Ideological', *Critical Sociology*, 41 (3), pp.433-448.

Reid, J. (2012) 'The Disastrous and Politically Debased Subject of Resilience', *Development Dialogue*, 58, pp.67-81.

Rinne, P. and Nygren, A. (2016) 'From Resistance to Resilience: Media Discourses on Urban Flood Governance in Mexico', *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning,* 18 (1), pp.4-26.

Rose, G. (1997) 'Situating knowledges: positionality, reflexivities and other tactics', *Progress in Human Geography*, 21 (3), pp.305-320.

Rupert, M. (2003) 'Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-)vision of the politics of governance/resistance', *Review of International Studies,* 29, pp.181-198.

Ryan, G.W. and Bernard, H.R. (2003) 'Techniques to Identify Themes', *Field Methods*, 15 (1), pp.85-109.

Scatamburlo-D'Annibale, V. and McLaren, P. (2004) 'Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of 'difference'', *Educational Philosophy and Theory,* 36 (2), pp.183-199.

Smith, K.E. (2006) 'Problematising power relations in 'elite' interviews', *Geoforum*, 37 (4), pp.643-653.

Smith, N. (2010) 'The Production of Nature' in *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*. 3rd edn. London and New York: Verso. pp.49-91.

Sundberg, J. (2007) 'Researching resistance in a time of neoliberal entanglements' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.269-272.

Swindon Borough Council (2014) *Swindon Local Flood Risk Management Strategy*. Swindon: CH2M. Available at: http://www.swindon.gov.uk/info/20019/consultations_engagement_and_surveys/19

1/local flood risk management strategy consultation lfrms (Accessed: 31 March 2016).

Swyngedouw, E. (2007) 'Dispossessing H$_2$0: the contested terrain of water privatization' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.51-62.

Thaler, T. and Hartmann, T. (2016) 'Justice and flood risk management: reflecting on different approaches to distribute and allocate flood risk management in Europe', *Natural Hazards*, 83 (1), pp.129-147.

Thaler, T. and Priest, S. (2014) 'Partnership funding in flood risk management: new localism debate and policy in England', *Area*, 46 (4), pp.418-425.

Valentine, G. (2005) 'Geography and ethics: moral geographies? Ethical commitment in research and teaching', *Progress in Human Geography*, 29 (4), pp.483-487.

Valentine, G. (2008) 'Tell me about…using interviews as a research methodology' in Martin, D. (ed.) *Methods in Human Geography*. 2nd edn. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, pp.110-127.

Watts, M. (2007) 'What might resistance to neoliberalism consist of?' in Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. and Robbins, P. (ed.) *Neoliberal Environments: False promises and unnatural consequences*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp.273-278.

Welsh, M. (2014) 'Resilience and Responsibility: governing uncertainty in a complex world', *The Gmeographical Journal*, 180 (1), pp.15-26.

Wiles, R. (2013) *What are Qualitative Research Ethics?* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Winchester, H.P.M. (1996) 'Ethical issues in interviewing as a research method in human geography', *Australian Geographer*, 27 (1), pp.117-131.

Appendices

Method	Description	Motivation for Use
Semi-structured Interview	Ranged from approximately 40 to 90 minutes Face-to-face Use of pre-determined questions, while allowing openness for further discussion	• Allows for experiences and opinions to be garnered
Long Interview	Ranged from approximately 90 to 180 minutes	• More exploratory interviews, allowing narratives and details to be discussed • Mostly still in the form of semi-structured interviews
Group Interview	More than one interviewee	• Allows for debate within and opinions of a group • Often held when it was felt by the interviewee that other participants could add to the discussion • Mostly still in the form of semi-structured interviews
Electronic	E-mails	• Used for brief correspondence with participants, often to check on or gain additional information • Used (only once) to carry out questions and answers when the participant was unavailable for face-to-face contact
Telephone Interview	Interviews over the phone	• Arranged when meeting face-to-face was unachievable, e.g. due to difficulties with travel, or busy schedules of interviewees
Video Interview	Interviews over the internet allowing face-to-face contact	• Arranged when meeting in person was unachievable, but face-to-face contact was still sought

(handwritten) NAMES/COMPANY INFO. BLACKED OUT TO ENSURE ANONYMITY

(handwritten) STRUCTURE OF INTERVIEW SUBJECT TO CHANGE DEPENDENT ON FEWER/MORE ISSUES RAISED.

████████ questions
(handwritten) prompt sheet

Explain topic, give consent form → *(handwritten)* for recording

GENERAL STARTING *(handwritten)* EASE IN

(handwritten) TOPIC PROMPTS: TO STAY ON TRACK

1. What is your background in FRM/within the company? How long have you been/did you work here?

2. Overall, how are the ████████ responsible for flood risk management (in Swindon)?
████████

3. Can you tell me about any projects in Swindon?

POLICIES *if not, set out policies* → *(handwritten)* see understanding first

(handwritten) re/de-reg

4. How familiar are you/Are there any past national policies you feel have been significant in changing your approach to flood risk management?

5. How? (increased responsibility)
   a. e.g. partnership working in *understanding the risks...*

(handwritten) consequences

6. Do the policies produce confusion? (e.g. Flood and Water Management Act – huge range of regulations) *(handwritten)* follow up any policies mentioned

7. Any difficulties of implementation of policy?
   a. Cost
   b. Working with other stakeholders

(handwritten) (prompts to explore if this comes up)

8. How have you incorporated SuDs? *(handwritten)* discuss maintenance issues if brought up

STAKEHOLDERS *(handwritten)* (main themes)

9. Who are you the main actors involved in FRM?

10. Over time, policy documents have shown increased focus on stakeholders working together in partnership. How do you find working with different stakeholders?
    a. Any difficulties?

(handwritten) partnership

(handwritten) localism

11. How do you find working with local authorities ████████

12. How do you find working with the EA?

13. How do you find working with private stakeholders?

14. How do you work with landowners? ████████████████████████ ████████████████. Have you experienced any conflict of interest with other stakeholders, such as landowners or private developers, because of this?

(handwritten) state

15. What role do you believe the central government should play in FRM?

confusion

16. There are obviously a large number of stakeholders now involved in managing flood risk. Because of this, does there exist any confusion regarding who is responsible for what? *(don't lead)*

consequences

17. Is there an adequate level of dialogue with the central government regarding different flood risk responsibilities?

18. Is there an adequate level of communication with other stakeholders ▬▬▬

SELF-RESPONSIBILITY — *could go on to Partnership funding*

19. Returning to partnership working, how do you work with members of the public to deliver FRM?

individualism

20. What role do you think members of the public and communities should play?

21. Has there been any change in the amount of involvement of the public in your flood management?

22. There has been increasing responsibility put on the individual and local communities over time. What is your opinion of this? *FOLLOW UP GOOD /BAD OPINIONS*

23. Are there any consequences for members of the public of having more responsibility?

consequences

    a. Do members of the public have the capabilities to protect against their own flood risk? *↳ challenge positive opinions* *(privatisation)*

24. Who's responsibility is it to implent/pay for flood resilience measures? *commodification*

resilience

    a. What role should private developers play?

25. Should those at risk get flood insurance?

    a. What is your opinion of a risk-based system of pricing in flood insurance? *- would you prefer FRM to be public/private.*

RESPONSIBILITIES & CONSEQUENCES

26. How do you think flood risk management responsibilities for these FRM actors have changed over time?

27. How have the ▬▬▬▬esponsibilities of FRM changed over time?

devolution

    a. Do you feel like you've experienced increased amounts of responsibility for flood risk management over time?

    b. Why/how has policy changed this?

state

28. The central government are putting increased focus on the devolution of decision making to more local groups. Why do you think the central government are doing this?

neolib.

29. How do you think FRM responsibilities are likely to be affected by policy movements such as the Big Society initiative in the future?

30. Do you think that your level of responsibility is justified? Is it fair? *+ why?*

31. (Do you think the government affords you an adequate amount of decision making power for the amount of responsibility you have?)

32. Do you find any difficulties with delivering FRM now you've been given more responsibilities?

    a. Do your increased FRM responsibilities mean there are trade-offs or opportunity costs of projects?

    b. How do you think these changing responsibilities impact how well we can mitigate flood risk?

devolution

33. Are there any positive outcomes for you of getting more decision-making power?

resilience

34. Policy has put an increased focus on resilience and soft measures, over resistance and hard defence measures. Why is this? Is this reflected in your FRM?

35. What is your opinion of the level of funding available for FRM?

    a. What's your opinion of Partnership Funding?

funding

    b. What's your opinion of Section 106/CIL funding? What is the role of private finance in your opinion? ↳ *raised in previous interview*

EASE OUT — where do you see the future of FRM? any final comments etc.

Do you have any questions for me?

Would I be able to contact you in the future?

↳ *+ SNOWBALLING*

<u>APPENDIX C – Interview Participants with Motivations</u>

Institution/ Type	Number of Participants	Type of Data Collection	Motivation for Sampling
Transport Authority (1)	1	Face-to-face interview (long)	• Experience of flooding in Swindon and the South West area
Transport Authority (2)	1	Face-to-face interview	• Experience of FRM in the region
Transport Authority (3)	1	Face-to-face interview	• National experience • Knowledgeable about national policy
Flood Charity	1	Face-to-face interview	• Previous involvement in an FRM project in Swindon
Community Group (1)	1	Face-to-face interview	• Based in Swindon, with an interest in FRM
Community Group (2)	2	Face-to-face group interview	• Based in Swindon, with an interest in FRM
Individual (1)	1	Face-to-face interview	• Lives in a flood risk area • Experiential perspectives regarding developments in floodplains
Individual (2)	1	E-mail correspondence	• Lives in a flood risk area
Local Authority (1)	1	Face-to-face interview	• Risk Management Authority in Swindon • Knowledgeable about a range of local policy
Local Authority (2)	1	E-mail correspondence	• Knowledgeable about funding arrangements for FRM and planning
Private Developer	1	Face-to-face interview	• Previous involvement in Swindon developments
Planning Authority	1	Face-to-face interview	• Experience in Swindon • Knowledgeable about a range of planning policy
Contractor	1	Face-to-face interview	• Previously involved in the region on FRM projects
Mary Dhonau	1	Video interview	• Experienced and well known in FRM
Emergency Services (1)	1	Face-to-face interview	• Experience in the region
Emergency Services (2)	1	Face-to-face interview	• Past experience with flooding events in Swindon
Neighbouring Authority	1	Telephone interview	• Knowledgeable about cross-boundary issues
Environment Agency	1	Face-to-face interview	• Risk Management Authority - Experience in a range of FRM strategy on a national level
Flood Action Group (1)	1	Face-to-face interview (long)	• Based in Swindon • One of the most important groups in the town
Flood Action Group (2)	3	Face-to-face group interview	• Based in Swindon • One of the most important groups in the town
Housing Association	1	Face-to-face interview	• Previous involvement in a Swindon development
Landowner	2	Group telephone interview	• Local and national knowledge of both FRM and land management practices
Consultant	1	Face-to-face interview	• Practical knowledge in the field, based within the region
Water Company	2	Face-to-face group interview	• Risk Management Authority based in the region
Total:	**29**		

- Went well - friendly & willing to talk
- Enjoyable conversation
- Knowledgeable
  ↳ given more contacts (good gateway)
- Fewer leading / closed questions
  ↳ more open   e.g. 'What's your opinion'
- Found taking notes counter-productive
  ↳ better to keep eye contact & listen
- Body language relaxed & positive — engaged
  in conversation
- Trains very delayed!
- Good focus on external stakeholders
  ↳ difficulty of guaging changing
     responsibilities due to length of
     employment

MAIN POINTS:
- +ve   partnerships, pro self-responsibility
- PLP   poor
- Flood Re: more long-term focus needed
- Mistrust, blame, liability — working with
  public

TRANSCRIPT ✓   5½

APPENDIX E – Coding Example and Information

a) Code Descriptions

Letter Reference	Code Name	Code Description
A	Uneven development	Where the consequences of neoliberal mechanisms are discussed in regard to the uneven impacts on members of the public
B	Unequal Relationships	Any data that suggests the relationships between stakeholders (especially public and institutional) are unequal
C	Resilient Communities	Any instances where the reasons for and consequences of resilience for communities is discussed
D	Local Knowledge	Any data regarding the value of increased local knowledge thanks to devolution
E	Understanding	Any instances where the understanding of members of the public regarding FRM is judged
F	Displacement of Responsibility	When a participant does not assume responsibility, or has a perception that another stakeholder or mechanism has displaced responsibility
G	Scale of Governance Responsibilities	Any instances whereby there is a scalar description of governance approaches, e.g. being *closer* to the public, government being *distant* etc.
H	Unequal 'Partnerships'	When partnership working is seen to be negative or lacking, due to instances of poor communication and engagement practices
I	Resource and Funding	When the partcipant discusses the level and efficiency of resource and funding for FRM
J	Individual 'Choice'	Data regarding the 'choice' of flood insurance and opinions of Flood Re
K	Maintenance Responsibilities	Any comments regarding the poor level of maintenance and implementation of SuDs by private bodies
L	Business Approaches	Any instances where there are negative/positive consequences of the way in which private companies manage flood risk
M	Powers	Any instances where the amount of power a stakeholder has is discussed
N	Bureaucracy	Any data regarding political or bureacratic processes and settings of FRM
O	Targets and Prioritization	Any discussion of the ways in which FRM is assessed, through targets (e.g. cost-benefit analysis), and prioritized, e.g. against housing

b) Interview Transcript Example

All identifying information and pronouns removed or edited for anonymization

Hope: So just to start off with what's your background?

Participant: ███████████████████████████████████████
██
██
██
██
██
██
██
██
██
██
██
██
██████████████

Hope: So umm tell me about how err ████████████████ are responsible for flood risk management?

Participant: ███████████████████████████████████████, we're responsible for basically everything in our borough. Were a highways agency, we're the planning authority and we're the flood risk management authority (Hope: yeah) So err… we are unique in some respects, in that everything has to be done within…one area whereas a county would have districts and other areas added on. Those powers will be dissolved to those districts. Umm…we're currently going through some changes…or aspirational changes, the Council's got for disseminating some of those powers out to parishes (G) (Hope: ok) that's probably something you'll ask me about a bit later on (Hope: mmm). ████████████████████████
██
████████████████████████████████████

Hope: A lot of responsibilities then.

Participant: Umm yes there is, but as the act says, we are responsible to manage flood risk, that doesn't necessarily mean we have to resolve flood risk (Hope: right ok), and that's the political part of what we say (N). So yeah there's a lot of responsibility on the authority, definitely.

Hope: Yeah OK umm so if we go back to the policy quickly. Umm, just… Are there any policies that you're aware of that have been quite influential in changing how you flood risk management?

Participant: Yeah, as I said ████████████████ we had the surface water management plan which was umm…if I go back to the 2007 floods, which was probably the national benchmark for where the changes started to come across country wide. Umm the Pitt Review, forgive I can't remember his first name, but he used to be somebody within the

████████████████ (Hope: oh right) He wrote, he wrote paper for the government with ninety-two recommendations. The government *accepted* those ninety-two recommendations which basically started localizing management of flood risk (Hope: uh-huh). So we had umm we had the Pitt review and then subsequently, we moved with the Pitt Review, there was a requirement for the borough and other…lead local authorities because they weren't lead local flood authorities, they were local authorities at that time (Hope: laughs, yep) …to start preparing what they refer to as surface water management plans. And that was the borough's way of meeting its obligation to start identifying where flood risks...occurred, and collecting and trying to collate all that information into one area. Umm… it was because resources and pressures on the council we used partnerships, ████ ██████████████ (Hope: oh, yeah) And they did the majority of the work for us with the overview of us managing what they did. That was, again, the aspiration. (I) (Hope laughs) We got a draft. (disappointed tone) Err we never got it signed off, and the draft is published on our website if you want to go on to the website, the ██ website (Hope: right) and look for the surface water management plan, (Hope: thank you) and I think you'll find the draft version is on there, so that's the early document. (N) And then subsequently we went through the stage where we started with the water management act. Which is the 2010 Act…in between that there was the EU directive, the 2009 EU directive, which asked us to provide preliminary flood risk assessments...a-and umm I think that'd due for renewal next year if that continues on where it goes. We had to provide mapping, flood risk mapping, for the borough in line with the guidance that was set by the directive and err that's what we, that's what we were working on. (Hope: mmhmm) I'll be openly honest now because there's no point in saying that we weren't, we've *never* been resourced (Hope: ok) to cope, with the initial changes. Err… we tried to put them into…areas that where, people that were working might be able to facilitate and do a little bit of it. But the majority of the work was undertaken by consultancy. (Hope: ok) Because that's why the council was working so if there exists any problems any pressures, they went to external partners and we had a contract with them, ████████, as our er, partner. (Hope: ok). (F) Err that's and that's how we we managed, and it was a case of err where and when we dipped in and had meetings (Hope: where you can fit them in, laughs), and then they produce the document and it was agreed and because we are a political organisation, it then goes through the filter process of being err looked at by m-members, lead members and then they decide whether they're going to accept…what's gonna be published, on behalf of the council. (Hope: right ok) (N) So that's where we are, and those maps are umm on the same website so if you search through our website, you might have to click a few times (Hope laughs) but if you get if you get stuck, just send me an email saying you are looking for something and I'll see if I can send you a link (Hope: thank you), so there's no problem with that. Umm yeah and then we ended up the umm, the err…the flood. We had the land drainage act of 1991, that's still current and that runs with the flood and water management act of 2010. (Hope: uh-huh) So, and 2010 we became a lead local, we became the lead local flood authority [listing tone] (Hope laughs), and we are also the risk authority, with with others and then we produced a local strategy, the local flood risk management strategy (Hope: mmhmm) I don't know if you've seen that? (Hope: Yeah, yeah). Again, that's, that was done in depth, and in the time it goes through the political process, it's filtered *down* and you can take what you think that says or what it doesn't say. [disappointed tone] (N) (Hope: yeah) And err basically the council reviews flood risk through planning. Err, planning applications come I, they have to look at things like flood risk assessments associated with the bigger developments, err drainage strategies (Hope:

mmhmm)…and and the theory is that we manage it through that process. Reality is, we probably don't manage as well as we should do because we're not *resourced*, like every other authority. (Hope: right) And umm, the *other* elements are that we've never increased the resource since I've been here until last year where we've got one other person now. (Hope: Right…yeah) So that's, that's where we are. (I) So yeah, we we are, we've got a lot of things we've got to do. (Hope: mmhmm) [listing] We've got risk registers, data asset collection…um…requirements but as I said, the council…,because of the constraints on the budgets that come into the local authority, it's very difficult for the council to prioritise all, all funding so…flood risk isn't really what we consider to be a high risk for the council (Hope: mmhmm), because of the demographic of the population. Err, the-the older generation, funds are normally directed towards them. And…we do what we have to do, we try and meet what we have to do, what we have to do. (O) We're never sort of…playing ahead of the game (Hope: mmhmm). It's literally, we're…we are *reacting* to what we need to do at the time, and sometimes it is…umm…a little bit of lip service (Hope: right ok) Right? (Hope: yeah) To be honest, that's my honest, that's my honesty – I don't want to fool you by giving you a load of spiel what, what we do. The realities are we *react* to what we need to react to, and we try to meet though deadlines (N) (Hope: mmm) Uhh..and err yeah, sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't (*Hope laughs*)

Hope: So what's your opinion of the level of funding that *is* there then?

Participant: Umm…my personal opinion is the fact that there is a lot of aspiration from government without providing resources a-and budgets required to meet it (Hope: right, ok). And that is *nationally*. Umm…I-I-I meet with colleagues and I think we're all agreed. (I) Some authorities that have higher flood risks than we do…resource it, some authorities embrace it err, other authorities like ourselves don't consider it to be a priority (Hope: mmm), in the sense of…limited funds and other priorities, it has to go into that list. And *unfortunately* it's not deemed as very high. I mean ████████████████████ ███████████████████████ we struggle with surface water flooding, fluvial flooding, river flooding is-is…is has an impact, but our biggest impacts first are surface water impacts (Hope: mmm), infrastructure problems and things like that. (O) So yeah, my personal opinion is that there could always be more money and there could always be more resource. (Hope: Right, ok). And until that happens, we will be doing what we're doing. (I)

Hope: So umm, what, are you aware of the Partnership Funding that's been brought in?

Participant: Yeah, yeah.

Hope: What's your opinion of that?

Participant: I mean again, for partnership funding you mean for flood defence and things like that (Hope: yeah), yeah match funding and things like that (Hope: yeah, yeah). Yeah we've used it, we've done a couple of schemes. █████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████ (Hope: yeah) that we've…put in there, that we went through the FDGI process of funding, Grant In-Aid? (Hope: yep, yep) And that's the partnership funding. The changes to it now are going to make it more difficult for the funding to be delivered because of the *bureaucracy* that's involved, and the amount of work that's involved. (N) Obviously match funding requires resource, err to engage with partners, chase funding and err…get designs, and an agreement, and err find other funding schemes than what the council's got. (Hope: mmm) So from *my* perspective it's going to

make it very difficult, we've probably delivered our last project under that unless it's resourced more. (Hope: mmm) (N)

Hope: Mmm, and is that because there isn't enough money that you *can* get from those sources?

Participant: Umm, it's not so much just finance, it's the *whole package*, it's the requirement that's err involved to build a, an appropriate par umm, project appraisal review to go forward to get it reviewed by the Environment Agency (Hope: right ok), to get it…it's also having the resource needed to build that case. It's not a five-minute task (Hope: no). *Years* ago you know I used to be able to meet Environment Agency officers out on the site and we'd agree…where some works might benefit…aaand I used to go back and it used to be a…straightforward process (Hope: right). Now it's become very bureaucratic, it has to meet the green book legislation from government. And so it's…it's umm yeah it's…in my view it's too much about project managers, it's too much about…all the bureaucracy involved and there's not enough engineers making decisions that are…(Hope: on the ground) and then there are decisions that become subject to financial *constraints* (Hope: right ok). (N) So what the *right* decision might be from an engineering point of view, will have to be, pardon the pun not intended, watered down (Hope laughs) to fit the budget, and then you bring down the level of protection. And so yeah, it-it's, in my view it's not a happy place at the moment (Hope: no) I mean we get a lot of spiel from government about £30 million for the Cumbria floods, £30 million doesn't buy you *anything*. (Hope: no) It doesn't buy or pay for anything. So, no in my opinion, it's going to make things extremely different for *us* as an authority. (I)

Hope: Ok. So umm, what role do you think the central government *should* play?

Participant: I think the idea of sending it out to localism is *good*, because there's nobody that knows better than…local, err local people of the flood risk, (D) but errm, I think they just haven't realized the volume of work that's involved and the existing infrastructure that's in *place*. Umm you can't change… millions and millions of pounds of infrastructure to cope with what we're…expecting, and what we're getting this year, you know for example getting those increased downpours (Hope: yeah). And they're not gonna be less, you know they're gonna continue. So, so from that point of view…yeah. I don't know if that answers the question or not. (I)

Hope: laughs. Yes, yeah definitely. So you've touched briefly on partnership working and working with other stakeholders (Participant: yeah). Umm, how have you found…working-

Participant: We have, umm, the Environment Agency are slowly but surely becoming…less effective for us as a local authority, because of their remits and their own cutbacks and changes are…are putting pressure on their *own* resources. So the-they become more of a, what's the word I'm looking for, a *letterbox*…umm system, where they've got so many forms that are down to the individual to fill out, so they haven't got the experience or the resourcing in house anymore (N) (Hope: right). *Same* as local authorities, you know there isn't the resource. ██ ██ ██████…are an enigma (Hope: right). Yeah. Umm…within the borough as a whole they've done a lot of upgrading and err, they've done some major works which they will argue they've invested umm…millions of, millions of pounds on upgrading infrastructure (Hope:

mmm). But umm, what they are, is stepping back is, ███████████████ is a risk authority, ████████ is a risk authority and the ███████████ are a risk authority. So those three, really, should be working hand in glove…(Hope: yeah) to deal with it. But because ███████████ remit covers such a wide area, we tend to get what we're given (Hope: right ok), in the sense of bringing anything to the table. *They* have their own projects, (H) we've engaged with them, ████████████████████████

██

███

██

██

███

██

███

██

██

███

█████████████████████████████

Hope: Ok. Umm, yeah I've seen, I've looked at a few consultation documents online, and they do seem to be the ones that turn up the least.

Participant: In what respect sorry?

Hope: Oh, so like the consultation meetings.

Participant: Oh right, yeah yeah. Well…the council has numbers of pressures to build volumes of houses, schools…so if there's difficulties in finding drainage designs. Drainage is always the last thing that's thought about in planning applications or anything else (Hope: yeah)…it doesn't lead it. In European countries, Germany, France, wherever, the drainage and the flood risk leads where the development is, all the drainage infrastructure's in place, and the remaining land is where they build (Hope: right). Here, they try and fit the…retrospectively they try and put the drainage in so… (O)

Hope: Bit of an odd way round.

Participant: ██ ██

Hope: I think █████ may have mentioned him as well.

Participant: ████████████████████████████████████ fought tooth and nail to try and get the re-,errr, policy put through government, which was a householder's insurance (Hope: right ok). Because a lot of insurers stopped…ermm…issuing flood risk on their policies (Hope: oh right). So now…they they've kind of, working their way forward. (J) It's not 100% but it's the best you'll get, err ███ now working on a question ██ asking government which is…brilliant question, are we building today sustainable developments for 30 years' time (Hope: mmm). And *nobody* is telling you (Hope: right) …that we are. So currently still building…in the *same* processes, in the *same* locations...in the same manner. We are making slow, small progress in getting SuDs, so Sustainable Drainage Systems. Err…but they are…minor (Hope: yeah). And then we have the other complexities of that,

who managing those SuDs drains. Err developers might get management companies in, that's the way the Council tries to..to do it, the management, do they manage it at a level that it's gonna carry on working or is it (Hope: yeah) you know. You can have a lovely system of you know rooftop drainage into water butts (Hope: mmhmm), you can have highway drainage going through swales (Hope: yeah), and all of it you know, perfectly reasonable time, but in 5 years' time, if it's not well maintained, some of that system won't be working. (K)

Hope: Right. So how do you find working with private developers then?

Participant: Umm, very tricky, because they're a profit organisation. (Hope: mmm) Whenever it comes to partnership funding, or umm…partnership working, we're always going to be up against it because we're a non-profit organisation, and they're all profit making organisations. So their key driver is the pounds and shillings at the end of the day. We have finite budgets, but we have bigger responsibility, so it's a frustrating exercise. (L)

Hope: Right, ok. So umm, how do you find the, the level of communication that's there overall?

Participant: There's…hundreds and hundreds of workshops that EA laid on, capacity building workshops, umm, government-led DEFRA ones. And…they're *full* of giving guidance of what local authorities should be looking at, what they should be doing for capacity-building and everything else. It's just, basically, our authority, like other authorities, feels like it's Big Brother just telling them what they've got to do. (G) And the reality is they can't fund it. (Hope: right) Or resource it. And, and of course it's*, nationally* the level of engineers is dropping down as well, and the insistence of…paying project managers to deliver projects without having the engineering background is always going to cause a problem (Hope: yeah, ok). So…you know, unless you've got the engineering experience, you've got a limited resource to be falling back on to get the right solutions. And we fall into that trap, and end up having people review design, who don't necessarily 100% know what they're reviewing. [disappointed tone] (Hope: right) And it-it's tricky. (N)

Hope: So it's that lack of knowledge as well?

Participant: It is, I think there's that knowledge-base lack. You know, it's not *all* doom and gloom, there is work out there, you know modelling data's come on…umm but it's…*Local* authority is-is in a very tricky situation, or a very tricky position, because it *has* to do this, but it also has the other pressures as I said earlier. *And* you know, there's a fine balance between getting…what is perceived as a risk, a flood *risk*…er r…delivered over and above what's actually perceived as being a *need* (Hope: right). So if you need…5000 houses, 10000 houses, that's a fact. (Hope: right, ok) We work on probability, on the potential that could flood, so…if you're in a political world of four years, then you're gonna take the fact over the risk, aren't you (Hope: right, ok). (O) And of course people…the general public, the ones that are flooded and continue to flood, will raise the err…you know, raise the umm…bar and ask the questions, and say what are you doing about flood risk (Hope: mmm), and the ones that have never flooded are more conscious of, why are you increasing my council tax. (D) I can't get to work, I can't get my children to school because I'm having to drive 20 miles, so why are you not building a school close to me. So, yeah, it's that priority balance. (O)

Hope: mmm. So how have you found *working* with members of the public in flood risk management?

Participant: In *general*, when you talk to the public face to face, they know the pressures we're under (Hope: mmhmm). Ermm you always get variances across that, what people *perceive* as flood risk and what actually *is* a flood risk. You know people get soggy back gardens (Hope: yeah) and that isn't deemed as a *risk* because it's not ingress, if it's ingress flooding…then *that* becomes a priority, but then we have the benchmark of where 10 or more properties have to flood before we start formally writing reports on it. (Hope: right, ok) (E) But we manage it, we're very good at reacting, and that's what do do, we react to whatever the problem is, and if it needs time and it needs a bit of resourcing, we'll probably do it. Because most of our flooding happens and then goes away within hours (Hope: right yeah). All of our watercourses are reactionary, so they react very quickly, and also go down very quickly. So unless you're there at the time, you may not see the level of flooding, because it's all gone (Hope: right, yeah).

Hope: One of those tricky situations, mmm. So umm, how about community groups, for example the Flood Action Groups that were set up?

Participant: Yeah, ███████████████████████████████████████ set up ermm, 4 groups I think she managed to get going. We had one *good* group up at ████████████ that was already established, and they were quite a good community group because they'd already addressed some of the problems themselves. They'd taken on, as a parish, they provided their own surface water management plan and started to look at err, ways that they could protect themselves. (C) When we came on board they became less proactive and *expectant*. (Hope: right ok) Ermm once we'd stopped talking in finances and things like that, as a parish they couldn't afford it so there was an expectation that.. (B) That was *one* of the areas that we did get some funding to do some works out there (Hope: mmm), we provided ermm…err mitigation, flood mitigation scheme for them with FDGI funding, so (Hope: oh right). Yeah, that was one of the areas. But that was really on the back of that the parish were very proactive. A couple of the other groups, err, that umm, █████ set up, folded – I haven't seen or heard anything from that (Hope: right) and the ███████████████ one…I think is still *active*, it's quite proactive…err or, active, I don't think they're *pro*active that they do anything for themselves…(Hope: right). There's…they meet and they tell us what we should be doing. (B) (Hope: ok) And I think that's got some political influence on that one as well (Hope: oh right?) so we do tend to get…as an authority, if there's a political will we tend to steer *towards* the political will. So those who shout loudest get served, basically. Alright? You might want to probably put that down as my personal comment because that's probably.... (A) (Hope: yeah, yeah of course) And that's, that's *it* really, from the group side of it, we-we do engage, we do try and find out, we did find █████████ quite helpful by providing you know, local knowledge and *sharing* of knowledge, but err…once…once you've spoke to them about 7or 8 times about the same subject, there isn't much more you can pick from it you know (Hope: right). So… (H)

Hope: So do you think community groups are a good way to go?

Participant: Only if the community is prepared to take on some of the responsibility. I think it's…if you…if you're in an urban environment, they won't work. (Hope: no) If you're in a nice little rural setting, a community setting, where you've got a brook that runs through the…you know through the village, and you've got a Sunday morning bacon roll coffee

morning to clear a bit of reed out from the local bridge of whatever, they work fine. But from, taking on responsibility....I think its...from my experience, that they don't particularly like doing it. *Occasionally* you'll meet a resident that wants to take on and start striving it, but they're usually older people, the younger people don't engage. (C)

Hope: Why do you think that is?

Participant: I think the sense of community is...is *different*, I think the older generation ███████████████████████████...they, they had a stronger *sense* for community. I think now we're so...so busy, we don't have that sense anymore. People come home and shut the front door and *isolate* themselves on x-box or you know, wi-fi or you know, facechats, I dunno...doing all that (Hope laughs). I don't do it...(Hope: yeah). But they're you know, they're only...they're very few and far between to get actively. *Some* of the communities where they've got, umm, where they've got a combination of cultures...sometimes they're very...good at *other* things within the community they don't seem to...don't seem to take it.

Hope: don't seem to engage, mmm. Umm, so yeah you've talked about working with parish councils and that type of thing, how's that?

Participant: In *some* cases it's really good. (Hope: yeah) You know, they take on board what guidance we give. Other ones it's a little bit more tricky, because there's always an expectation that it's our responsibility, our problem (H) (Hope: mmm) They're *no* different from members of the public, if a road floods outside their house then they immediately they call the council and say my road's flooded what are you going to do about it. It might not be anything to do with the council (Hope: no). Err there might be a section of err...you know somebody phoned up and said my garden's flooded, as I said earlier, what're you going to do about it. Well nothing, it's *your* garden. (Hope: right) You know it's not...(Hope: it's your responsibility) it's *your* responsibility. You know it's a very difficult message to sell and err, we spend an *awful* lot of time, and resource...responding to err, enquiries on flood risk from parishes. And...going out and looking at issues, that *really* are neighbourly disputes, landowner disputes, and things like that. (F) (?). Aand, it's a very difficult message for us to get across, especially with a political...beast that we work for, that they don't like to be seen to be giving negative messages in case they lose votes. (Hope: right, very political) *Yes* it is. This authority is *very very* political. *Most* of the decisions are made by a politician rather than a good engineer. (Hope: right) Or good, informed, qualified people. (N)

Hope: What impact does that have then, on how well you can manage the risk?

Participant: Err...the impact is that we have an awful lot of meetings and an awful lot of discussions and err...we tend to go round in an awful lot of circles. (Hope: right) Yeah, ever-decreasing circles. So...and that's my personal opinion. (Hope: yes of course) (N) The *reality* is that until the council err, resources and takes it as a priority, we will be *reacting*, we won't be doing anything other than what we are doing at the moment. (Hope: mmhmm, ok) And at the moment we seem to be coping, and as long as it's perceived as coping, it doesn't change. There's no succession plan in, there's no forward-thinking. Only on the grander scale of volumes of houses and where they're building them, aspirations of community developments, and giving fancy names for villages (Hope: they're the priorities). But they won't *necessarily* change any of those because of flood risk. They'll

umm, manage the flood risk within them, by saying…they've got drainage designs, consultants and modelling to prove that it's fine. But *we* all know that the changes will cause problems in the future, which we're experiencing *right now*. A development that was built ten years ago is causing localised flooding issues, so you know…we're not really improving. (O)

Hope: Right, ok. So we've talked about quite a large number of stakeholders that are involved, and so as you said, like members of the public will call you up and think it's your responsibility. (Participant: yeah) Do you think that there is that *confusion* there over who is responsible for what?

Participant: Ohhh, *definitely*, definitely. That's national, yeah I think that's national. The government will never tell the public that it's their responsibility to manage *their own*…issues, so they give that problem to local authorities. (F)

Hope: Why's that?

Participant: Again, because they won't want to be seen to be saying that they can't do *anything* about it (Hope: yeah). You know you get all the spin, you get David Cameron on the telly standing in 2 foot of water in green wellies or in a boat (Hope: yeah), and isn't this awful, and they'll invest money to do something in the short term, but the *longer* term is never addressed. (N) If you take Somerset flooding for example, every engineer that I've ever spoken to has said it's a waste of money that they've spent on…because the tidal change brings 5000 tonnes of silt movement with it every time the tides change (Hope: right). So it's not gonna take long to put 100,000 tonnes back to where it is, unless it's maintained and sustained. And they're already *arguing* about where is money is going to come from for annual dredging (K) (Hope: already). And the Environment Agency doesn't have the resources to-to plug in to do maintenance across networks (I) (Hope: no). So yeah…I, you know, the government, the country as a whole, has this whole mythical perception that we're this green wonderful land where all the water's going to go away. And I think that that's still…sits in the back of people's minds, you know you look around and we've got hundreds of fields, they'll be able to take the water. It's not understanding *what* the causes of flooding are (Hope: no). And until you understand the…reasons behind what causes the flooding, you're always going to have the same problems. (E) As I say, most of those is surface water, it's *infrastructure* problems (Hope: ok). It's drains, systems that were built in the 1960s and before. We have Victorian drainage ███████████████ █████, which takes foul *and* surface water. *They're* not designed to deal with the 21st century surface water events. So umm…every time it rains heavy, as you've probably experienced living in Swindon, the *roads* will get very wet…it's for a short period of time, but if you happen to live under the highway, you'll get wet. (Hope: mmhmm) But then, you know…it's not our infrastructure, it'll be ██████████ who own most of the infrastructure (Hope: ok), what are *they* gonna do about it. So it's *politics*, politics at the core. (F)

Hope: Right, tricky. So umm, why do you think the government have designed to do all of this devolving of responsibility?

Participant: It's because *they* don't want the responsibility, and they don't necessarily have the funds. It's the same as we're devolving to parish, we're doing the same thing, we're putting errr, responsibilities of…errr…maintenance responsibilities and other

responsibilities onto parish without giving them any extra funding. It's dissolving of the responsibility, it's not really benefiting anyone. (F)

Hope: right, so it's not really a positive thing?

Participant: No, I think it's a good *idea* to have people managing their own areas as I said before, but unless you resource it and give them the strength to do it, it's *just* not going to work. (Hope: right ok) (M)

Hope: So umm, there's obviously this big push for self-responsibility for members of the public as we've said (Participant: yeah). Do you think that will bring about any …outcomes or consequences for the…members of the public themselves?

Participant: It, it yeah. The consequences of anyone that's flooded are huge. Reselling the house, ermm, having the insurance premiums rise through the roof, umm it's it's huge, you're gonna end up with, in time, unless it's addressed, deprivation areas of where flood risk *is*. You're gonna find properties, in my opinion, you're gonna find areas where there's *always* been flooding or there's gonna be flooding where properties are virtually gonna be run down or can't be sold, and people aren't going to be able to move. (Hope: right ok) Because if you're buying your first house for the first time, which you'll be doing if you haven't already, you'll you'll be checking out to see where all the flood risks are. You'll be checking, *you* don't buy a house which has a probability of flooding of reasonable risk, and even *then* you know. And those people have to *sell* their house. (Hope: yeah) So you're gonna have sections of the community…that are gonna have…houses that they can't sell. And that's nationally I think. (A)

Hope: So then, is it, well, the people in the more deprived areas that would be the hardest hit?

Participant: They are yeah, they are now because the more affluent communities will be able to find the funds to protect themselves. You know the ones that aren't, you know, so well off are going to be struggling to err, improve resilience on their property, house, whatever it is. We have sections of our community which are very wealthy. (Hope: yeah) And their own personal properties are *huge*, they're probably more than my *house* is worth. You know and they're properties, so they can afford to do so. (A)

Hope: Umm, who do you think *should* be responsible for paying for the property level resilience measures?

Participant: *Again* I think, I mean this is a tricky one, a lot of this is in hindsight, I mean a lot of this evidence has been coming towards us for 25 years on what we're going to be experiencing, increasing rainfall events, weather patterns changing. (Hope: yeah) So I think *everybody* has got to hold their hand up, so individuals, everyone should be *aware* of what you know, what's coming our way. And keep you know, doing that all the time [gesture], hiding away from it, it-it's got to a point now where this year, I think is the first year people within the office environment, are speaking about the intensity of the rainfall events this year. Well we've had it for the last 2 or 3 years, it's just that this year is more so than it was before, because it's been a Summer. (C)

Hope: mmm, yeah definitely. So why do you think there is now this big focus on *resilience*, so whereas in the past it was more on hard engineering and resistance?

Participant: Resilience is basically being brought back because you can't change infrastructure and you can't change anything else. So if you've got existing, err levels of roads, drainage as I said before, you've got houses on certain levels, and now we're talking about increasing sea levels and everything else (Hope: yeah) so you know, resilience has got to be the way to go because you're never going to be in the position to protect. Soft engineering has always been a good solution (Hope: yeah), you know it's always been a solution that I've always favoured because, if you can *manage* the flow, and direct them, you're ok. But if you continue to build in floodplain, you can't send that water anywhere else because that's where the water wants to go. (Hope: yeah) In a time of flood, the geology you know, topography takes over, it doesn't matter *what* you've got in place. So err, yeah. (C)

Hope: So what role do you think private developers should play in that?

Participant: Err, I think they should be *accountable* for building resilient properties. (Hope: right ok) And they should be accountable up to the point if a house they've built, *not* within 10 years – 20 years, 30 years, floods…then they should be err compensating the owner of the house. That's the only way you'll get any change. (Hope: yeah) But then they'll put the houses up 50% because of the risk associated with it. So the *government* will never put that pressure on them (Hope: no), because it's all about affordable housing. (Hope: right, the mantra *laughs*) Yeah it is, affordable housing, cheap cheerful, build them at the least cost, the maximum profit, and you're always gonna run the risk that they're not going to be sustainable. (L)

Hope: Right, so there's not that maintenance there then?

Participant: Yeah, but you know the public aren't *always* aware of what they buy. I mean if they buy a house that backs onto a watercourse (Hope: yeah), they put a fence up in front of it, it's someone else's problem. But they are responsible to the centre line of that watercourse. (Hope: right ok) Just because they've put a fence up doesn't mean it's not their responsibility, and that's a difficult message to get across. But then they might sell their house on, with that fence already in place (Hope: yeah) and the person that's bought the house in good faith doesn't *know* that's their responsibility. So when that ditch starts surcharging or has problems…who pays for *that*? (E)

Hope: Right ok. So, you know…Section 106 in planning?

Participant: Yes. It's CIL now. (Hope: sorry?) It's more CIL now.

Hope: Oh ok?

Participant: It's gone to CIL, Section 106 funding you mean from properties?

Hope: Yes.

Participant: You might want to look at the, I don't know where it is, but a colleague of mine might be able to help you, I'll give you ▮▮ details so you can talk to her about it. (Hope: thank you) ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮…it's CIL now. Section 106 still holds. (Hope: mmm?) Up until recently, we as an authority struggled to get, umm…funding *from* the Section 106

because it was a case of internal processes, and what the funding was allocated for, because Section 106 comes with a lot of *constraints* on it (Hope: right ok). And err flood work and resilient work was never identified when Section 106 was…put into place, so it would be more like your community arts, providing parks, walkways, dog walks, cycle paths, things like that. (Hope: oh ok) So flood wasn't part of it? We *have* managed to get some Section 106 because the Council *did* realise that that was another funding source. (N) Errr, the Council has now [inaudible word] that the *larger* developments go through the CIL, and I don't know what the CIL stands for, Community Levy Funding, Community Infrastructure Levy or something like that? ████████████████████████████████ ███ ███ ████████ And umm…yeah, ████ tell you how CIL works and I think it works on a bidding process, as I understand it you have to put a business case in, a lump sum comes in to the authority, and then individuals can apply a err business case to get it, and I *think* we're allowed to do that for…flood risk management. (Hope: ok) But ████ will tell you whether we are or not.

[brief interruption, interview continues]

Hope: So, right we were talking about the CIL and everything like that. How well do you think that's been working?

Participant: ██ ████████████████████████████████████. As the authority you'll find that…we don't have a dedicated team to do anything really, we have single points of contact and err, as we call them, single point of *failure* (Hope laughs). But roles sort of…take on other bits of roles that sit in other…remits, so umm yeah, it's difficult to say because if you've got, you've got one person that's looking at flood risk – we have one person that's looking at the planning applications (Hope: yeah), and err that's it, from from a drainage point of view. We have a ██, *they* have an assessment process that they go through for the planning applications, but that's more and more coming over to us because costs of sending it out to consultants was *huge*. (Hope: right) So it's all about reducing overheads and costs, without building *resource*. I think they call it 'work smarter' (Hope: right) which basically means less for more, we get, or more for less. Those are the buzz words we get, and that basically is…is normal person speak for…we're not doing what we should be doing, and we haven't got the resources to do it. (I)

Hope: Right, so it's the spin on it.

Participant: It's the spin. There's an awful lot a spin. You know I could have sat here and gave you chapter and verse on what we're doing and what our aspirations are. There's a lot of aspiration, and it *is* aspiration. They'll be a *lot* of things going around on what we have done, what we've achieved, what benefits we've brought to the town…and umm, they *are* benefits in some cases, you know the two projects I refer to, there will be referring to ████████████, because that the Environment Agency's err…and we contributed to that. So there are, there *are* schemes that are being built, and that will be what people will be saying we've done, that's the improvements we've made. (Hope: that's the focus) Yeah, and…you know, but the local day to day flood risk management, is…is resource hungry, and it's a reactionary system. (I) █████████████████████████████████████

██
██████████████████

Hope: Mmm, thank you, ████████████████████████. Umm, so we've talked about private developers and things like that. Do you think there should be more or less focus on *private* management of flood risk management?

Participant: In what context do you mean by private management?

Hope: So for example, umm instead of a lot of responsibility say on local authorities, leaving it more up to private developers to do it, private consultants, things like that.

Participant: Yeah, that's where the Council's heading towards, is getting management companies in for the development sites. The Council is pushing for that, so management companies take on those responsibilities. (Hope: mmhmm) Again, err being in the local authority for a long long time, just this one, experience will say they will do what they have to do…(Hope: right) Unless those maintenance regimes are fully understood from…*why* they're being done, from the flood risk point of view, what's the required level of maintenance (Hope: yeah), and unless somebody is overseeing that, and and enforcing that…I think they will become, a bit like grass cutting, [inaudible part]. And they will probably react like we do when it goes wrong, they'll probably get a gang out, there and clear a culvert out or something, and probably shift the problem on. (Hope: right) So yeah, I sound really cynical (Hope: no, no), and it's a little bit of realism, a little bit of honesty (Hope: no it's good, thank you), it's err yeah, it *does* sounds cynical. (K) I don't *think* the country as a whole…is addressing flood risk *at* all. Coastal or anything ████████
██
██████████████████████████████ Well they've changed the *boundaries* on that, they had the Shoreline Management Plans. (Hope: yep) Defend at all costs, those ones you've probably looked at them. (Hope: yeah I've looked over the course) They've changed, they've changed since they were originally done. Because there's nothing you can do. Well there *is*, but it's gonna cost you *huge* sums of money.

Hope: and that's not gonna happen.

Participant: And that's not gonna happen.

Hope: So where would *you* like to see the majority of that funding coming from?

Participant: If they *gave* the gov-…*I'd* like to see a change in the structure of local authorities. The-giving them the powers is fine, I *do* like the fact that you're more informed about your own patch for want of a better term. (M) (Hope: mmm) I think that that should be resourced. It should be resourced to the point of a…a thorough, thorough volume of resource that allows you to carry out maintenance and umm…and find, mitigation where you can, flood mitigation where you can. (Hope: mmm) It's…it's pie in the sky stuff now, we've gone too far down the other line now, we'll never be in that position. And we're not alone, that's…*I* think that's nationally. (Hope: right ok) So we'll *never* be in a position where we'll have it, and to be honest I don't think the *engineers* are out there anymore that would do it (N) (Hope: no). You know, so and of course the times that the salaries don't match some of the other salaries, the civil engineers that are going through school now, going through university, and they go into the banking world and the project management world, because their salaries are three times, double, three times that if they were

engineers, so. You know, and you can't *blame* them, (Hope: no) you know as you *say*, you've got a £9000 a year school, er university fee (Hope: yeah you need something to pay it off *laughs*). Yeah, so…can't *blame* unless, unless they attract, the civil engineering industry becomes you know, a…a more recognised profession in the sense that it's probably worth more than the current rates of pay that they're paying, people will choose to go where the…(Hope: where the money is) where the money is. *And* to be honest you know, if you come in, who wants to trudge through a muddy ditch in the middle of January, when you can sit in an office with your nice pointy shoes and your nice suit on (Hope: mmm) and be a project manager. You know it's that kinda thing.

Hope: Ok, so I just have a last few questions for you before we wrap up (Participant: Yeah that's fine). So umm…in terms of, we've talked a *little* bit about flood insurance, you *mentioned* it briefly at the start. What's your opinion of that, should members of the public be um…*expected* to purchase flood insurance?

Participant: This is a *tricky* one for me because err…as in, from the *Authority's* point of view, umm…we are requested to provide guidance, letters and other things to insurance companies about what we're doing to manage flood risk. (Hope: mmhmm) Because…err householders have asked us to do so, because insurance companies have asked them to provide…what the local *authorities* are doing to try and reduce their premium. (Hope: right ok) *Personally*, I think it's like everything else, umm…if you've got to buy insurance, you gotta buy it. If you buy a house that's in a high risk area…umm, you should be…ummm, taking that into account of your personal expenditure when you're buying that house. (J) On the other hand, if you're in an area that's *become* a flood risk, because of the changing climate, (Hope: mmhmm) then I think there should be some help out there towards…giving certain parties, certain members of the community, the older generation, the…you know, the ones that *can't* afford it…some support, now whether that comes from government or whether that comes from…others contributing it depends on your viewpoint, it depends on whether you think the country should all contribute to the areas of weakness. Umm…personally, I'm quite comm-community orientated in that view and I think, everybody's premiums should go up to help though that are struggling, but that's just a personal view. (A) (Hope: ok) ████████████████████████████
████████████████████████

Hope: Right ok, so umm, flood insurance is moving towards, well trying to move towards more risk-based pricing (Participant: yeah), are you not supportive of that?

Participant: It depends on what mapping they're using, (Hope: ok) and what probability they're using for the, for their err risk-based approach. Because of the err, there's a variance in…in risk err, at the moment I think it's if you're in 140m of a watercourse, or 150m of a watercourse, your insurance is naturally going up. (Hope: right) But you might be in 150m of a watercourse but 10m high (Hope: yeah), so the chancing of you flooding are gonna be…minimal (Hope: ok) But err so…it depends on what mapping they're using and what data they're using to build their probability models. It really does.

Hope: Is the data available then?

Participant: I think the data varies in, in it's accuracy, umm…and I think it can be manipulated for profit…(Hope: right ok) we get…we, we have the national mapping that we use which is the Environment Agency's mapping…(Hope: mmm) umm but we have

developers coming in and disagreeing with the extents of flooding (Hope: oh right). And err yeah, it's real pressure all the time, it depends, and then of course you get the old argument, you know it's a probability, it's a risk…you know it's a gamble (L) (Hope: how can you predict) Yeah, yeah, betfred, do you pop to betfred and pop a tenner on the fact that you'll never flood (Hope: yeah, laughs). And it's that kind of thing, you know so yeah…so yeah, I think it really *does* need someone to get a hold of…of…the national modelling, which *is* the Environment Agency, and say *this* is the modelling that everyone should use. But…

Hope: I suppose it would be fairer on the consumer as well.

Participant: Yeah, I mean if you're taking *that* view, I think sharing the pain is always going to be less, but then again you'll get people who in deprived areas who don't flood and wonder why their insurance has gone up £20 a year, £30 a year, £100 a year (Hope: mmm), you know it's it's one of those things…it's alright if you've got a few quid in your pocket…but if you're fighting hand to mouth every day, you've got three children, you're a single parent and you're living in a council house (Hope: mmm) to get your umm…to get your insurance to protect your…your goods, if you're in a high crime area for example, I-I, you know, a higher crime area for example…err then someone putting 30, £40 on top of that is a big *ask* (Hope: yeah). So you know…but if you're living in the affluent areas or the rural areas, and er you know, you've got your 3.5 Mercedes outside your driveway (Hope: laughs, mmm), £40 you know isn't gonna make that much difference. So it depends on your…perception of what…sharing that pain across does. (Hope: right ok) It's a difficult one. (A)

Hope: Ok I think the…final question I really have for you is umm…are you aware of, say, the Big Society initiative that the government tried to bring in and things like that?

Participant: David Cameron, is the-the, yeah. This was all about the partnership funding wasn't it, yeah, getting involved in community groups, business getting involved. (Hope: yeah). Yeah…(concerned tone) It's…in my view, it's 50 years too late (Hope: right ok) It's…never going to happen. (Hope: really?) I don't think so, I don't think so. Look at the recent elections…you know, if you talk to the younger element, a huge percentage say it was the biggest…it was the wrong decision and it was the biggest mistake that we've got to carry through for our future. You talk to the older element and it's the best thing we ever did (Hope: yeah). So…err…you know you've, you've got too many divides within the community. (B) You've got isolated communities, you've got umm, different cultures, you know you've got *Asian* communities, *Chinese* communities. Umm, they don't integrate with each other, you know and…where they *do* it's minimal (Hope: mmm). Big cities like Bristol, they're a multicultural city, ermm you might find that that works a bit better. If you get you know, you'll get pockets of resilience in more urban areas that are not big cities, you know and I think that's what led to the vote, mainly. And…I think that that Big Society is a wake-up call, I think. I think it is, I think we've gotta change…how *we* view what we *want* from our society, big society…and again this is just personal…this doesn't. (Hope: yes, yes of course) This isn't the council's view, the council will obviously support it because it's a Conservative-led council, so they will see it, they will see devolving powers to the parishes as being you know, a…meeting that big society, giving more power to the parishes (Hope: yeah). You know…reality is, that it's offsetting responsibility. (F)

Hope: Right ok, so what do you think then for the future of flood risk management?

Participant: I think we will carry on doing what we do, we will react. Umm....and I think as a country we will react. I think every few years we will get, umm…the news items, it will hit the headlines, and then you'll get the politicians, maybe a member of the royal family, walking down in their wellies, and they'll throw some money at it, and then it'll go away again. And the aftermath's never cleaned up. You know you've still got people out of their houses in Cumbria that have been out of their houses for two *years*…you don't see them on news at ten every night do you. (Hope: no) So…I think it will be a continuation of reacting until…the point of no return. Where something *really* disastrous happens (Hope: right). We don't you know, you know, if it's like Germany where you're losing hundreds and hundreds of lives with something like a landslip or something like that that's washing villages away *completely*…maybe something might change. But all the time it's just…a couple of bridges, standing there watching a couple a bridges washed in…an occasional dog walker gets lost or something…it's not gonna be. (Hope: ok) Sorry it's *really* cynical (Hope: no no no it's good) Quite bleak stuff, but I just can't see it…I can't see it. So (N)

Hope: Ok brilliant, well I think that's all I have to ask you.

Participant: If you have any *more* questions, don't hesitate just to email me with a question, and I'll respond as best I can.

Hope: Thank you.

Participant: Give me a call even (Hope: thank you). This isn't a one-off meeting and run-away, if you've got other questions. When we get back, I'll have a look at my…emails and I'll give you those details.

Hope: That would be brilliant.

Participant: Do you want me to send those as an attachment, I can do that while you're here.

Hope: That would be good actually. Do you have any questions for me?

Participant: No, no, I just wish you luck with your err…endeavours to get your dissertation done.

Hope: Thank you very much.

Conversation continues like this, recording ended 1:04:11.

c) Example Coding Table – Resource and Funding (I) shortened for inclusion

- Stage 1 – Quote copied (Column 1)
- Stage 2 – Description added (Column 2)
- Stage 3 – More detailed analysis, allowing for a theme to emerge (Column 3)

Quote	Description	Analysis
(LA) And err basically the council reviews flood risk through planning. Err, planning applications come I, they have to look at things like flood risk assessments associated with the bigger developments, err drainage strategies (Hope: mmhmm)…and and the **theory** is that we manage it through that process. **Reality is, we probably don't manage as well as we should do because we're not resourced, like every other authority.** (Hope: right) And umm, the other elements are **that we've never increased the resource since I've been here until last year where we've got one other person now.** (Hope: Right…yeah) So that's, that's where we are. So yeah, we we are, **we've got a lot of things we've got to do.** (pg2)	Describes the responsibilities of flooding, especially in terms of planning	Specific management of flooding in planning – suggests this is the largest factor they try and do

Lack of resource *nationally*

Never increased resource – interesting, especially due to expressed efforts by EA to increase capabilities

Large amount of responsibilities expressed, but not enough resource.

Resource over funding – more an issue of manpower and materials than money for him |
| (LA) Umm…my personal opinion is the fact that there is a lot of aspiration from government without providing resources a-and budgets required to meet it. And that is nationally. (pg2) | National resource and budget needed for government aims | Responsibility of the *government* to provide resource and funding (not meeting that responsibility)

'aspiration' vs budget mismatch - powers and responsibilities devolved but without the capabilities to actually perform them |
| (LA) I think the idea of sending it out to localism is *good*, because there's nobody that knows better than…local, err local people of the flood risk, but errm, I think **they** just haven't realized the volume of work that's involved and the existing infrastructure that's in *place*. Umm you can't change… millions and millions of pounds of infrastructure to cope with what we're…expecting, and what we're getting this year, you | Good vs bad | Contradiction emphasises – good idea, bad in practice

Emphasis on the long-term development of *infrastructure*

Impact of past on future – connection of history |

know for example getting those increased downpours. (pg3)		They = state: responsibility of the state to figure it out
(LA) it's all about reducing overheads and costs, without building *resource*. I think they call it 'work smarter' which basically means less for more, we get, or **more for less**. Those are the buzz words we get, and that basically is…**is normal person speak for…we're not doing what we should be doing, and we haven't got the resources to do it. (pg11)**	Lack of resources means that there are initiatives to reduce costs	Lack of resources – even more pressure is put on by ideas such as 'work smarter' Impact of 'we're not doing what we should be'
(LA) Yeah, and…you know, but the local day to day flood risk management, is…is resource hungry, and it's a reactionary system. (pg11)	As above	As above
(LA) So yeah, my personal opinion is that there could always be more money and there could always be more resource. And until that happens, we will be doing what we're doing. (pg3)	Status quo	Reactionary again
(EA) Um, how local authorities receive their flood funding is quite complicated, in that it comes all through um, a pot for lots of different aspects of it. Um, it's not always entirely clear when local authorities, um, to see how much is absolutely…allocated to flood risk. Um and that I think makes it difficult for local authorities to…um…be *confident* that they are investing the right amount of money, or for *communities* to be confident that their local authority is doing it. So, um…I'm sure local authorities could use more [I: laughs], I know they are very stretched, um we *see* that on their resources and staff particularly, in supporting on flood risk measures (pg10)	Local authority money not safeguarded – one large pot – local authorities don't have enough	Complicated funding system – again due to paper-based processes? Need for ring-fencing *Resources* especially
(D) Um…well from my time in local authority, there's never enough funding for it. (pg7)	Lack of funding	*Never* enough – no change
(HA) So at the time that we were first involved in ▉▉▉▉▉▉, we had…one member of our community investment team, umm…on the back of the work, and the umm…*added value* we could see…umm, that team provided on	Budget constraints mean reduced focus on working within a team	Impacts mostly on *communities* *Negative* impact of de-reg & more focus on working with communities – lack

▓▓▓▓▓ and the, um reduction in antisocial behaviour, improvements in community cohesion, you know those types of things, err the team, increased to *three* members. And until three months ago, I think there were 8 or 9 in the team, and they were also taking on…*again* previously local authority led…err, training schemes, youth involvement, you know that type of emphasis. But, you know, like local authorities, we've been hit as well with rent reductions and various other constraints. So unfortunately, we've had to, um you know reduce that team down, so I think there's two and a half…members of that team now. It's a real shame. (pg2)		of resource to actually match it
(I1) We can…you know…we can only…pay for it, either by *increasing* taxes or reducing what we spend on other things. (pg6)	Funding should be increased	Posed as a simple solution (either/or) – partnership funding/private funding etc. – not touched on
(E1) I think it's the constraints of finances for them. And, they are struggling, they have a, a pot which is getting smaller and smaller, as is well known, it is getting smaller and smaller, they have to be a bit more tight in what they're doing with things. They've got bigger priorities to look at as opposed to flooding.	Lack of funding	Especially lack of funding *priorities* = poor success of FRM
(E1) There's a part of me that says there should be more [funding], but that's because of vested interest. But the realist in me says that there is a finite pot of money, and there are greater things, there are greater requirements, you know, at the moment, we can spend hundreds and thousands and millions on making ourselves prepared, putting in flood alleviation schemes and all the things that go with it, and then we have, I think up in Cumbria recently we had a massive big flood alleviation scheme, and then they had the flooding and it actually breached that, because it was, oh we engineered it at this size, and that's unprecedented and it just broke the whole lot down. I'm trying to think of the place, but then… Yes. It's, it's,	Funding is inadequate – quality and quantity	Lack of funding – would be good to have more for individual stakeholders, but wider picture suggests otherwise State *always* depicted as struggling, with a lack of money Funding is spent inefficiently – flood assets fail due to *unprecedented* risks: difficult to spend money well when it's based on probabilities

you know, if you have more money it would be brilliant, but it's the way to spend it. And the reality is there isn't the money there. (pg9)		
(WC) Um, there was a good injection wasn't there, after the 2013…um storms, but as I remember that only, it didn't actually keep it anywhere near current levels. I think the spend over the last five years, if you take a look at where it has been, it now *less*. Um, so it's, it's underfunded and you know, the Environment Agency, they are making hard decisions. Um, 50% of the assets now are minimal maintenance, and that's evident in Swindon where there's limited *interest* in the peripheral areas. Um and there's some hard decisions to be made, um…in those areas. (pg9)	Lack of funding, especially for the EA	Less funding over time Lack of funding = 'hard decisions' – lack of maintenance *Especially* Swindon's peripheral areas (e.g. Wanborough?)
(E2) Clearly at times of austerity all of our organisations are *shrinking,* umm so that creates its own challenges as well. (pg5)	'Austerity' responsible for resources	Has an impact of partnership working (mixed in with other phrases)
(E2) With the money they've got, I think all the organisations do the best that they can, but all of them could do with more funding. (pg6)		Need for more funding – repetition
(E2) I *think* the downside of that is…we do that, and *give* up some of our training and exercises which would make up *competent* in it. So, it's getting that balance right all the time. (pg6)	Less funding = less competency	Lack of funding = more risk
(MD) But they've only got a small-ish pot, if you actually look at a pie-chart of how much money DEFRA gets as a department compared to every other department, it's the *smallest* little slice (pg3)	Not enough funding due to lack of prioritisation	Department of Environment lacking
(MD) Now the government *don't* have the money to provide for everything, and they *don't* have the resources, the Environment Agency's staff has been taken back, local authorities. I worked for a local authority last year and there were literally *two* people in the department, the floods and water department, managing the whole of a very large county. So they *can't* be everywhere (pg4)	All round lack of funding	State, EA and LA deficiencies – lack of protection from agencies therefore
(EA) I don't think there's enough, enough funding for any of it frankly,	Lack of funding in *infrastructure*	Nationally

especially around the countryside. All the infrastructure is severely strained, wearing out rapidly and not enough money going into it, and I think you'll see that for all infrastructure in the UK I think. (…) and not enough forethought and planning. (pg3)		
(CG) It's difficult, we can often go out and get little sums, a few hundred pounds from the local authority organisation or the parish council or from a ward, in Swindon the wards have Area Boards, which cover more than one ward usually, and they have a bit of local funding and we can tap into that sometimes. A thousand pounds here and there to buy a new machine, new grass cutter or something. Little jobs. Um, and we raise a little bit of money, very small sums from activities like events we run. Most of it comes from grants, or occasionally we get loans from people. (pg3)	Lack of funding	Difficult to raise money through many different means
(I2) Adequate. With finite resources, companies work hard and become more efficient (pg8)		One of the only ones Still shows awareness of 'finite resources'
(TA1) Because the funding is quite limited? And it's only recently that a different pot of money has come in to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ for…looking at specific high risk flooding areas to improve the network. In Area 2, the contract since 2012 has been an asset support contract which means that basically you are maintaining the existing assets, and getting as much out of what we've got there as possible. Erm, so what that contract first started there in 2012, it literally was *maintenance* only. No real schemes to improve the network, but they've suddenly realised you know…certain parts of the network haven't been touched since it was originally constructed 40, 50 years ago? Erm, we need to actually plan and put some schemes in to actually *reduce* the flood risk, to road users and anybody you know, surrounding properties. (pg5)	Limited funding = lack of improvement	*Old* infrastructure out of date Lack of funding and planning for organisation

(TA1) I think, with the austerity times that came in, I think they really needed to control what it was they were spending and keep more of an eye on what it was, and I think that's where all of it came from. Because the austerity measures came in 2010, you know late 2009, 2010, erm and it was kind of we don't have this money, so let's try this new contract where we…thrash the life out of these assets for as much as we can (pg5)	Budget changes due to austerity measures	Linked to change to ██████████████ (possibly unrelated to flooding)
(TA1) You'd need about £2 *billion* a year in order to…, and that was *just* in the South West region, to actually get the drainage up to standard. Which you know…is never gonna happen. So I think this is probably why they brought out this new…designated funds pot of money, so it was actually environmental issues? And when it came to sort of like you know flooding, we had a section that was flooding and water quality, and you basically bid for a central pot of money. Erm so you can put in as many schemes as you want, as long as they met the criteria, which was high risk flooding area, issues with erm culverts…erm and you know and proper flooding issues either upstream or downstream, and water quality. (pg5)	Flooding requires too large an amount of money to combat	Drainage is *too* expensive = bidding for money instead: had to meet the criteria Lack of money means the need for prioritisation of schemes (a good thing)
(TA1) A lot of people were made redundant between 2011 and 2012 during the change, because the hierarchy said we need this many people to maintain the assets ummm so the drainage team went from about 17 people…to 1. Yeah. So it was really difficult you know to do that, and that was the person who was you know at the forefront of the schemes identifying what was going on out on the site, dealing with all the problems that were coming on from the public. (…) and then of course you know because you're not having the *time* to be able to *promote* schemes…because you've got everything *else* to do, you would only probably have…I think, when I was on my own I was only able to do 3 schemes (pg7)	Lack of resources after redundancies	On *resource*- funding perceived as good, but resource extremely poor (make clear to make that distinction in write-up) Lack of resource = disadvantageous – lack of schemes being put through

(LA2) Er, central government, er, decided that they were going to bring out the Flood and Water Management Act, which comes with funding limits. And when they *give* funding, they don't ring-fence it for drainage works or floods or, any of the titles that they put it into. Er, so a number of authorities, it may actually go into the central pot and then it's spent on whatever they want. As oppose to directly for SuDs or drainage. (pg1)	Lack of ring-fencing of funds	FWMA = 'funding limits': disadvantageous to LLFA Don't *ring-fence* – not prioritised enough
(LO) they just made a big announcement and put more money *in* so that was very welcome. Um…and I think some of it will be, some of it's been allocated to more natural flood management, which is *great* I think they're starting to think about that. Um…I think and this sort of comes from what the Committee on Climate Change have said, there's a feeling that there isn't *enough* money going into flood management more generally, um particularly when you start thinking about more future risk and climate change. (pg4)	Increased funding going in	Thinking about future *risk* of climate change – good for now, not for LT
(LO) that's something the Committee on Climate Change have been critical on government, you know saying you're *not* supposed to be…keeping a flat, sort of budget line, you need to be investing more and more to deal with the situation (pg4)	As above	
(LO) it's difficult to tell *how* much money is right or, how much is enough. Um, I think what I'd be *keen* to see that we don't spend it in the *same* ways as we have in the past. Um, so I think we need to be a lot a *cleverer* about how we spend it. You know, as I said before, we need to look *wider* at some of the things we can do in the catchment, there will be some engineering structures that we need to do, but there are cleverer ways of doing it. And I think we should have looked at that before, so the money might be there, which is great, but I think we need to review…how um…how we spend it. (pg4)		Not about a *lack* of funding, but about not being spent in the right *ways*

(C) I don't have a problem with money, I think is a problem with efficiency. That money… I think… There's all governments or countries, they have to balance the limited money, they can't spend on everything, and just increasing the amount of money, particularly when the government has a large deficit to pay off, I don't think it's justifiable to spend more money. I think what has to happen is the money, because there is easily enough money if it was spent efficiently. It's all about spending that money… Far more efficiently see and it would be breaking up the EA, breaking up all the frameworks and turning the whole model much closer to to how the national lottery works. And return that money so that money can get back to the grassroots and implement massive change and improvement at you know, to the pe-, to the population (pg3-4)	Not about *lack* of money but about *efficiency*	Money needed to be returned at the grassroots Reasonable not to *increase* money due to deficit
• (TA2) The government can only do so much" – large amount of priorities of government, cannot afford all Leads to tensions – members of the public demand FRM from the central government, but do not want to pay more tax for it		
• (TA2) The ▮ is old and from pre-war onwards, there was 70-80 years where there was a significant lack of investment from the government. There is now a significant enough amount of funding available, however due to this time without investment, results cannot happen overnight. The money must be invested well to ensure a long term approach to safety, to ensure long term payback and results over short term profit. o FRM is a long term issue – this leads to pressures from a range of angles when there are demands for		LT vs ST - temporal

paradoxically short term results		
• (TA2) Future difficulties likely due to continuingly decreased funding from the government		
• (TA2) Lack of people, resources, money and strong political interference can discourage effective decision making		
(TA3) So...the the challenge for us now is is, I'd have said *previously*, there wasn't enough money umm, quite feasibly *now* there isn't enough money *now* but there aren't as many opportunities to say...that we don't *have* enough money because we've got to be able to organize ourselves better *internally* to make some of these things happen. And cut a lot of the waste out of the business...So I think...I *don't* think there is enough money, but...but I'm biased in saying that. (pg4)	Less opportunities to argue against funding	More focus and scrutiny from government: less chance to voice concerns about funding, as pressure and focus turned around *on* TA Therefore = less scrutiny on government in the long run
(TA3) So...to help us do that, to sort of facilitate that, in this first 5 year period, for the first time ever we've been given this ring-fenced...environment fund and...that fund can be spent on the little environment improvement projects that are beyond business as usual...so if it's not a maintenance or renewal project or it's not on a, not part of...part of what would be delivered as a major project going forward it falls between the gaps and therefore attracts this funding. And part of that is...is umm there's a commitment in that 300 million pound funding package to deliv-deliver flooding improvement schemes (Hope: right). Now I don't...there are no *fixed* funding packages, the 300 million is fixed and there's some...sort of negotiation around the...the environmental topic areas, biodiversity, cultural diversity, landscape...flooding, water quality, you know how much goes on which areas, but a good proportion of that is, is earmarked for delivering flooding schemes (pg4)	More ring-fencing is occurring	Better focus on environmental issues (although still not a *completely* separate thing)
(TA3) And so...you know whether we have enough money or not to some	Efficiency of funding	'bit of a hollow cry now' – nothing left to done?

extent depends on how much its gonna rain or not really, you know well, you know in terms of what the...what the scale of the problem is and what needs to be done but err...but...I...I...I think it's a bit of a hollow cry now. I think you know, you've got to say you've got to box cleverer, we've got to do smarter work, more in partnership with others, make up...our funding, you know get match funding from others to deliver those solutions and...so those are all the sort of things that are...funding's *always* an issue. Everyone will tell you that. It'll be up there at the number one risk. (pg5)		More about *efficiency* improvements than *amount*, but still an issue - Efficiency has to be improved *because* there's not the amount there Partnership working – main benefit as match/partnership funding
(AFG) No dedicated flood officer due to the cutbacks the council has received		
(AFG) Expertise is not devolved with responsibility – poor decisions impact local people, but that impact is not appreciated		
(FG1) came back and said...so when we had this meeting, I basically said why is the dam...at the road bridge, why don't you bring it upstream a few feet to allow it flowing over. And I asked the question and the guy from the Environment Agency, quiet, didn't answer. And this woman turns on him and says, you haven't reacted, it's possible isn't it. And this guy said yes, well what stops you doing it, er it's *funding*. And she then said, if ▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ funded it, would you do it. Um, he had to go away and...it cost us £50,000 and they did it. So that's reduced the flood risk *tremendously*. (pg3)	Local funding	Funding needed for schemes to go through – LA1 funding especially (funding becomes a local responsibility)
(FG1) I think it's more to do with central government putting more responsibility on local government and taking money off them at the same time. So it's...politics, local, central government politics. Local councils are responsible for doing what they can, but local councils are strapped for money. It's not just Swindon, to my mind it's generic. It's...the country can't go on spending as it is, but things will	Poor funding	Devolution as saving money Devolution as *politics* – central government displacing responsibility, concentrating wealth Local councils strapped for money, lack of money overall, lack of *efficiency* of spending

suffer…and it's where do you spend your money. (pg8)		

(LA) = Local Authority

(LO) = Landowner

(E1) = Emergency Services 1

Etc.

APPENDIX F – Selection of Codes

Self-responsibility
- Individualism
    - Uneven development
    - Unequal Relationships
- Resilient Communities
    - Local Knowledge
    - Understanding

Re-Regulation (Partnership Funding)
- Displacement of Responsibility
- Scale of Governance Responsibilities
    - Unequal 'Partnerships'
    - Resource and Funding
    - Boundaries

Privatization
- Individual 'Choice'
- Maintenance Responsibilities
    - Business Approaches
    - Powers
- Commercial Business
    - Bureaucracy
    - Targets and Prioritization

> All codes

Self-responsibility
- Individualism
    - Uneven development
    - Unequal Relationships
- Resilient Communities

Re-Regulation (Partnership Funding)
- Displacement of Responsibility
- Scale of Governance Responsibilities
    - Unequal 'Partnerships'
    - Resource and Funding

Privatization
- Individual 'Choice'
- Maintenance Responsibilities
    - Business Approaches

> Most relevant codes selected for further discussion

APPENDIX G – Coding Diagram

1. Mechanisms	2. Perceptions of Responsibilities	3. Consequences and Implications
Self-responsibility	Individualism Resilient Communities	Uneven development Unequal Relationships
Re-regulation (Partnership Funding)	Displacement of Responsibility Scale of Governance Responsibilities	Resource and Funding Unequal 'Partnerships'
Privatization	Individual 'Choice' Maintenance Responsibilities	Business Approaches

Look for:

- Genre (e.g. political and persuasive); styles; discourse – and the difference in this
    - Who has access to dominant forms and how other discourse is marginalised
- How texts were produced
- Direct/indirect language - passive/active
- What's represented
- Interactional analysis – interactional control
- Effect of context
- Cohesion – clauses, conjunctions, contrasts and comparisons
- Ethos
- Wording and word meaning
- Paratactic – short simple sentences together
    - Other syntax
- Representations of time and tense
- Pronouns
- Larger scale structure of text
- Experiential values
    - Ideologically contested words
    - Re-wording or over-wording and repetitions
    - Presuppositions
    - Modalities and agency
    - Nominalizations
- Relational values
    - Patterns of relations between words
    - Positive/negative wording
    - Euphemisms
    - Politeness and formality
    - Modes – declarative (SVO), grammatical (question), imperative (VO)
- Expressive values
    - Subjects and social identities assumed
    - Missing information in text
- Metaphors

All passages taken from:

Swindon Borough Council (2014) *Swindon Local Flood Risk Management Strategy*. Available at: http://www.swindon.gov.uk/info/20019/consultations_engagement_and_surveys/191/local_flood_risk_management_strategy_consultation_lfrms (Accessed: 31 March 2016).

Actual CDA shortened to be more practical for inclusion

"It is important to recognise that flooding is a natural process which provides numerous benefits including the recharge of groundwater, improvement of soil fertility, maintenance of ecosystems in river corridors and floodplain biodiversity. However, floods can also threaten life and health and cause substantial social and economic damage." (SBC, 2014, p.1)

- Positive against negative sentences

- Positive first – negative subordinated (to try and distract attention?)

- 'Social and economic damage' – formal and detached

- 'It is important to recognise' – authority and lack of modalities: presented strongly

"Given the risks, it is vital that we work together to understand flood risk better and seek to reduce the negative impact flooding has on people and property where we can. It is not economically, technically, socially or environmentally feasible to prevent flooding completely. We can, however, reduce and mitigate the negative impact of flooding through good planning and management, and effective investment." (SBC, 2014, p.1)

- Presupposition that readers know the risks of flooding

- 'We' – talking to the general public

- 'Vital' as strong, counter-acted by 'where we can' and 'seek to reduce': action as necessary, but little that can actually be done

- 'It is not...': provided as a fact – acceptance of risk

- Planning management, and investment last

"As LLFA, we are responsible for leading and co-ordinating local flood risk management, but we cannot do this by ourselves. Successful local flood risk management will only be achieved if those authorities with a responsibility to manage flood risk (known as Risk Management Authorities or RMAs), local communities and others with relevant interests and responsibilities, work together to deliver effective improvements….

- ['cannot'; 'only' – imperatives
- Active rather than passive sentences
- Contrasts – but
- Lack of naming of RMAs, communities named
- Working together will equal effective improvements]

"Some flooding remains the responsibility of other bodies, such as the Environment Agency. However, for those who suffer flooding, it matters little what type of flooding is causing the problem. Sometimes the type of flooding is not clear. Who to contact in an emergency, who to contact when you have experienced flooding, who is responsible for managing the risk and what you can do to protect yourself are important questions that need to be answered and are addressed by this Strategy…

- [Naming of the EA outright
- 'Sometimes the type of flooding is not clear.' – 'sometimes'
- Grammatical question: asking for info(of the strategy?)
- Many different responsibilities listed – 'what you can do to protect yourself' is last]

"In the event of a flood emergency calls should be directed to the usual 999 emergency number and Swindon Borough Council's emergency response will be provided through this route. However, we understand that after a flood event, a single body needs to act as the lead body. We are proposing that we act as the single point of contact and co-ordinating authority for recording and investigating (as appropriate) all forms of flooding in Swindon." (SBC, 2014, p.2)

- 'as appropriate': not actually all forms of flooding
- Contradiction of meaning: lead body needed only after a flood event vs. recording and investigating (not response, despite mentioning emergency response earlier)

"We want our investment…" (SBC, 2014, p.4)

- Managerialism discourse: prioritisation

- Lack of commitment here: only 'where practicable; where there is only 'possible benefit'; 'directed' – limited resource; 'highest demonstrable areas of risk' – those who can demonstrate get the resources.

- Euphemisms key – 'best available information' that will be 'revisited and adjusted' – lack of good information therefore

- Discourses of CBA, report (formal) genre, style of managerialism

- Avoidance of issues

- Passive sentences 'this prioritisation will be…'

"Delivery of the..." (SBC, 2014, p.4-5)

- Euphemism and lack of agency

- Partnership working – only valuable as a 'cost-effective' strategy

- 'including community groups' – subordinated and yet shows responsibility assigned

- 'every pound spent is effective' to attract funding – must demonstrate CBA

- MULTIPLE BENEFITS, not just FRM

- Last sentence – no modalities

- Range of connections – logical

- 'only'; 'need'; 'require'

"1.10. Personal responsibility..." (SBC, 2014, p.6)

- GIVEN A SEPARATE PAGE

- Sentence 2, 3 and 4– paratactics – contrasting of roles and responsibilities

- As statements, truths, facts – much more agency here

- Listing of tasks

- 'Aims to' – only through 'support' and 'awareness'

3. Responsibilities for local flood risk management

This LFRMS sets out our high-level vision for local flood risk management in Swindon. It identifies the extent of local flood risk in the Borough and establish priorities for managing that risk. The LFRMS also identifies how we will work together with other Risk Management Authorities, stakeholders and the local community to manage the local flood risk.

In producing the LFRMS, we have maintained consistency with the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy, published by Defra (the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) and the Environment Agency.

This LFRMS provides the means for us to discharge our duties under the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 to provide leadership and co-ordinate local flood risk management.

What is a Risk Management Authority?

Risk Management Authorities (RMA) are defined in the Flood and Water Management Act as the Lead Local Flood Authorities, Unitary Authorities, District Councils (for areas without a Unitary Authority), the Environment Agency, internal drainage boards, water companies and highways authorities.

Each of the RMAs has involvement in managing local flood risk. A full list of the duties, roles and responsibilities of the RMAs can be found in Appendix A.

(SBC, 2014, p.11)

- Use of box – attention drawn to outlining of responsibilities;
- 'Each of the RMAs has involvement' – consistently repeated: to say 'not just us'
- 'high-level vision' (unachievable?)
- 'establish priorities' (not very well written here)
- 'how we will work together', followed by policy (partnership working as regulation?)

"Working in partnership..." (SBC, 2014, p.11-12)

- 'Vital'

- Lack of agency, 'partnership' again

- Suggests passively that this strategy can't be successful without others

- 'multiple benefit' – not beyond core aim: this is contradictory to earlier: multiple benefits are needed to secure funding

112

- 'realistic' – not all can be done

"Risk Management Authorities…" (SBC, 2014, p.12)

- Water company responsibilities relegated last – singled out as not having as much responsibility: unimpressed?
- 'They', not 'we' now – displacement of responsibility
- Mentions delegation of functions – important for SBC?
- SBC covering their backs – able to remove their own responsibility apart from this one requirement

"3.4. The community" (SBC, 2014, p.12)

- *Longest* section of responsibilities chapter

- 'Recent reorganisation' – due to localism

- 'stronger'; 'resilient'

- (persuasive and promotional)

- 'trust' (lack of – euphemism)

- Greater participation seen positively – use of 'democratic' – seen well by public

- 'meet shared challenges' – poorly structured sentence, but Council's challenge now = community challenge

- Ideological basis of list: resilience, trust, local, partnership working

"The wider community…" (SBC, 2014, p.13)

- 'Vital' again – scare tactics

- Paratactics again – vital role vs can't do it alone

- No connector – does not want to say we *need* communities *because* of the lack of RMA capacity

- Must understand their own risks and responsibilities (so SBC doesn't have to do them)

- 'Everyone' – speaking for the wider public (agency strong)

"4.1. Improve knowledge…" (SBC, 2014, p.19)

- Lack of agency – good for management, not who *does* management (SBC)

- Prioritisation of resource and funding therefore – CBA

- Then diverted to *public* awareness to increase resilience: straight after sentence about prioritisation: local knowledge thus covers the shortfalls

- 'Best available'

- 'Consultation' (managerial genre)

"Swindon Borough Council…" (SBC, 2014, p.20)

- Funding decisions more localised (doesn't say partnership funding)

- Local participation encourage through benefits of funding – seems like bribery

- 'Fair' funding (due to lack)

- Always about SBC working 'together' – at the start of many sentences

- 'Aims' – modality of uncertainty

Document Summary

Discourse:

- Partnerships
- Lack of funding
- Developer responsibility
- Resilience
- Community responsibility STRONG

Style:

- Informative, but mostly persuasive
- Lack of specifics – more general audience: less business like and managerial than other documents

Genre:

- Policy document (and yet doesn't seem too formal – must consider production in local government and related capability/funding issues – "significantly watered down" rings true)

Dissertation Project (Student 1414068) – Ethics Form

Please tick or cross where appropriate

I agree to participate in this dissertation project.

☐

The dissertation project and the main research procedures have been described to me prior to the interview.

☐

I understand that my participation in this dissertation project is entirely voluntary.

☐

I understand that I am able to withdraw from this dissertation project at any time and for any reason until the end of data collection on October 1st.

☐

I understand that if I wish to withdraw from the project after this time, I may be unable to do so.

☐

I understand that any and all data collected will be treated with full confidentiality and anonymity, and identities will be kept anonymous from all apart from the dissertation supervisor both during the project and until the data and project report are destroyed.

☐

I agree to and am happy for the interview to be audio recorded.

☐

If so, I am happy for the interview recording to be fully transcribed.

☐

I agree to the use of direct quotes from the interview to be used within the dissertation.

☐

I understand that all recordings and transcriptions will be destroyed after the project has concluded.

☐

After the dissertation project is complete, I am aware that I will be eligible for a short debrief
of the study and any of its findings.

☐

I would like to receive a full explanation of results.

☐

Any further comments you would like to add:

```



```

_____   _____   _____
Name of Participant   Signature   Date